



**NCGM**  
National Center for Global Health and Medicine



INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH

# Global Health Diplomacy Workshop 2023 **Book of Abstracts**



**Date: 16-17, December**

**Venue: Zoom Meeting & Institute for Global Health Policy Research,**

**National Center for Global Health and Medicine**

**Institute for Global Health Policy Research, National Center for Global Health and Medicine(NCGM)**

MAIL: [ighp\\_event@hosp.ncgm.go.jp](mailto:ighp_event@hosp.ncgm.go.jp)

## <Purpose>

In the 2023 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare's Health and Labour Sciences Research Grant "Research on Senior-Level Career Development in International Organizations in the Field of Global Health and Effective and Strategic Involvement in Governance Conferences (23BA2001)," the research team aims to establish strategic intervention methodologies for Japan, and develop an effective global health diplomacy educational program. In addition, the research team aims to work with the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and other global health policy organizations and research institutions overseas to develop more realistic and effective interventions, as well as educational materials and training programs. There is an urgent need to cultivate human resources who can advocate for global health at the global level in harmony with international and national interests. This workshop was designed and will be implemented to help achieve such goals.

## <Target audience>

The workshop is open to young and mid-level public and private sector practitioners who are planning to participate in a governing body meeting of international organizations and have little experience in such international meetings. Possible affiliations include MHLW, MOFA, JICA, NCGM, universities, think tanks, NGOs, etc. Expect number of participants: 20 participants and observers (both on a recommendation basis)

## <Objectives and Goals>

In order to develop human resources who can strategically intervene in the discussion of global health issues and effectively advocate Japan's position at the World Health Assembly and other international conferences, the following educational objectives have been established

1. Understand governance in international organizations (UN, UN specialized agencies, partnerships).
2. Understand the pre-conference national coordination and conference preparation process.
3. Understand the standard rules for international meetings.
4. To be able to speak effectively at international meetings.
5. Acquire techniques for reflecting one's own arguments in international conference decision-making
6. Nourish an attitude for harmonizing international and national interests
7. Understand the unspoken rules/tactics international conferences

## <Date and time>

December 16-17, 2023

## <Style>

Lecture and role-play exercise, both in-person

## <Venue>

Institute for Global Health Policy Research, National Center for Global Health and Medicine

## <Language>

Sessions with only Japanese instructors will be conducted in Japanese, and sessions involving overseas instructors will be conducted in English. (Simultaneous interpretation will not be provided.)

## <Workshop Contents>

1. Overview on global health diplomacy
2. Resolution-making process and effective interventions (interventions, speaking methods)
  - How to read the resolution documents
  - How to prepare for an effective intervention
    - i. Examples from Japan and Thailand
  - Practicing Intervention
3. How to take the initiative in negotiations
  - Learning from past negotiation cases and personal experiences of resource persons

\* As part of the research, we will ask for feedback from the participants to evaluate our curriculum.

# Course Schedule

Day 1, Saturday, 16 December 2023		
Time	Session Title	Speakers
8:50-9:00	Sign-in on zoom online	
9:00-9:30	*Self-introduction and course objectives	Prof. Hiroyasu Iso (NCGM)
9:30-10:15	*World Health Organization and its role in global health governance (lecture) *Q&A in Japanese	Prof. Hiroki Nakatani (NCGM)
10:15-10:30	Break	
10:30-11:10	*Preparing participation in an intergovernmental meeting (lecture) *Q&A in Japanese	Prof. Kazuaki Miyagishima (France)
	*Intervention: dos and don'ts *Q&A in Japanese	Dr. Haruka Sakamoto (Tokyo Women's Medical University)
11:10-11:50	*WHO Global Code of Practice on International Recruitment of Health Personnel *Q&A in Japanese	Dr. Shinjiro Nozaki (WHO/WPRO)
11:50-13:00	Lunch	Please bring your own lunch
13:00-13:15	*Briefing on role-play sessions	Dr. Tamami Umeda
13:15-14:15	Team deliberation (60 min)	Group facilitators
14:15-14:45	*Mock-up Session (Plenary #1) (30 min)	Chair: Prof. Hiroki Nakatani Feedback from resource persons
14:45-15:15	Bilateral meetings (30 min)	Group facilitators
15:15-17:00	*Mock-up Session (Working Group #1) Break during the session (10 min)	Chair Country: TBD Feedback from resource persons
17:00-18:00	交流会 & bilateral meetings if necessary	Group facilitators

\*Sessions online by zoom

Red=Lectures in English; Purple = Roleplay sessions in English (Japanese language may be used occasionally)

# Course Schedule

## Day 2, Sunday, 17 December 2022

Time	Session Title	Speakers
9:30-9:40	Recap of Day 1	Dr. Eiko Saito (NCGM)
9:40-10:20	*Real-life negotiations: Case studies of difficult negotiations (lecture) *Q&A in Japanese/English	Dr. Satoshi Ezo (MOFA Japan)
10:20-10:30	Break	
10:30-11:30	*Introduction to negotiations (lecture) *Q&A in English	Prof. Suwit Wibulpolprasert Mr. Charlie Garnjana-Goonchorn (Thailand)
11:30-11:40	Break	
11:40-12:20	*Japan's leadership and experience in G7 Hiroshima Summit and G7 Health Ministers' Meeting (lecture) *Q&A in Japanese	Dr. Tomoko Onoda (WHO Cambodia)
12:20-14:50	Working lunch Team deliberation Bilateral meetings	Group facilitators
14:50-15:00	Break	
15:00-15:45	*Mock-up Session (Working Group #2)	Chair Country: TBD Feedback from resource persons
15:45-16:00	Team deliberation	
16:00-16:45	*Mock-up Session (Plenary #2)	Chair: Prof. Hiroki Nakatani Feedback from resource persons
16:45-17:00	*Wrap-up *Feedback Survey *Closing Remarks	Wrap-up (Dr. Umeda) Feedback Survey (Dr. Saito) Closing (Prof. Iso)

\*Sessions online by zoom

Red=Lectures in English; Purple = Roleplay sessions in English (Japanese language may be used occasionally)

# Speakers and Resource persons' list

## **Prof. Hiroki Nakatani 中谷比呂樹 (Japan/日本)**

Director, Human Resource Strategy Center for Global Health (HRC-GH), NCGM  
国立国際医療研究センター グローバルヘルス人材戦略センター(HRC-GH) センター長

## **Prof. Kazuaki MIYAGISHIMA 宮城島一明 (France/フランス)**

Visiting Professor, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Japan  
長崎大学 熱帯医学研究所 客員教授

## **Prof. Haruka Sakamoto 坂元晴香 (Japan/日本)**

Associate professor, Department of International Cooperation and Tropical Medicine,  
Tokyo Women's Medical University  
東京女子医科大学衛生学公衆衛生学講座 准教授

## **Dr. Shinjiro Nozaki 野崎慎仁郎 (Philippine/フィリピン)**

Compliance and Risk Management officer, WHO Western Pacific Regional Office  
世界保健機関 西太平洋地域事務所

## **Dr. Satoshi Ezo 江副聡 (Japan/日本)**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan  
外務省 国際協力局 国際保健戦略官

## **Dr. Suwit Wibulpolprasert (Thailand/タイ)**

Vice Chair, International Health Policy Program Foundation (IHPP), Health Intervention and Technology  
Assessment Foundation (HITAF), International Health Policy Program (IHPP Thailand), Ministry of Public Health,  
Thailand

## **Mr. Charlie Garnjana-Goonchorn (Thailand/タイ)**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand

## **Ms. Tomoko Onoda 小野田知子 (Cambodia/カンボジア)**

Health Systems Coordinator, WHO Country Office in Cambodia  
世界保健機関 カンボジア事務所 保健システムコーディネーター

## **Prof. Hiroyasu Iso 磯博康 (Japan/日本)**

Director, Institute for Global Health Policy Research (iGHP), National Center for Global Health and Medicine  
(NCGM)  
国立国際医療研究センター(NCGM) 国際医療協力局グローバルヘルス政策研究センター(iGHP)  
センター長

## **Dr. Tamami Umeda 梅田 珠実 (Japan/日本)**

Visiting researcher, iGHP, NCGM  
国際医療協力局グローバルヘルス政策研究センター(iGHP) 客員研究員

## **Dr. Toshiaki Baba 馬場俊明 (Japan/日本)**

Assistant Director, Bureau of International Health Cooperation, NCGM  
国際医療協力局 医師

## **Dr. Mariko Hosozawa 細澤麻里子 (Japan/日本)**

Senior Researcher, Department of Global Health Metrics and Evaluation, iGHP, NCGM  
国際医療協力局グローバルヘルス政策研究センター(iGHP) 主任研究員

## **Dr. Eiko Saito 齋藤英子 (Japan/日本)**

Senior Research Fellow, iGHP, NCGM  
国際医療協力局グローバルヘルス政策研究センター(iGHP) 上級研究員

\*NCGM Secretariats will also participate to assist the operation during the workshop.



## Prof. Hiroki NAKATANI

Title	Visiting Professor
Affiliation	Keio University Faculty of Medicine
Profile	<p>In the past seven years, Dr. Hiroki Nakatani has held academic positions in Japan as Visiting Professor of Keio University and Invited Professor at Osaka University Post Graduate School of Medicine. He is the former Chair of the Executive Board, WHO. Currently, Dr. Nakatani also serves in various national and international organizations as Adviser (International Affairs) to the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; Chair, Board of Directors, Global Health Innovative Technology Fund (GHIT Fund); Senior-Advisor, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) ; and Director, Human Resource Strategy Center for Global Health. He is a veteran public health specialist for over 40 years, who started his career at the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in Japan. He worked extensively in health policy, public health, international health, and health science and technology. His national career includes serving as Director-General of Health and Welfare Services in Hiroshima Prefecture, where he was in charge of integrating health and welfare services in preparation for the arrival of a rapidly ageing society.</p>
Lecture summary	<p>The first session, “WHO and its role in global health governance,” aims to achieve the following objectives : (1) to understand global health’s complex architecture with special attention to UN agencies’ roles, particularly WHO; (2) to understand the governance and operation style in different organizations, i.e., intergovernmental organizations and partnerships; (3) to gain practical skills to be an influential contributor in governing body meetings. This starts by analyzing the massive volume of background paper in a relatively short time. Participants are invited to visit the WHO governing bodies website (Ref.2) before coming to class. This experience will make participants miserable initially, but after the session, everyone will feel encouraged.</p> <p>The following sessions, Mockup interventions, aim at being an influential contributor in the official meeting. The four-step approach will be practiced; (1) Reviewing the background paper; (2) Digesting the instruction given by the Government after inter-ministerial discussion; (3) Drafting intervention and making actual intervention to fellow participants. At each step, there are seasoned hints and skills. They are shared, and Mock interviews enable participants to improve each one's intervention by practice and constructive comments by facilitators and among fellow participants.</p>
Reading list	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. WHO: Basic Document Forty-ninth Edition,2020 <a href="https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/BD_49th-en.pdf">https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/BD_49th-en.pdf</a></li><li>2. WHO: Governing Bodies website <a href="https://apps.who.int/gb/gov/">https://apps.who.int/gb/gov/</a></li><li>3. United Nations: Model United Nations <a href="https://www.un.org/en/mun/model-un-guide">https://www.un.org/en/mun/model-un-guide</a></li><li>4. グローバル・クラスルーム日本委員会：模擬国連マニュアル</li><li>5. <a href="http://jcgcc.accu.or.jp/manual.pdf">http://jcgcc.accu.or.jp/manual.pdf</a></li></ol>



## Prof. Kazuaki MIYAGISHIMA

Title	Visiting Professor
Affiliation	Nagasaki University
Profile	<p>Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima has extensive experience in health diplomacy, having served for over 20 years in international organizations such as FAO, OIE and WHO. Prior to his international career, he was also a member of his national delegation to the WHO's regional committee, Executive Board and the World Health Assembly. In particular, as the Secretary of the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission (2003-2009), he organized over 20 international meetings every year and facilitated inter-country negotiations for international standard setting. He is fluent in French and English and is regularly maintaining his knowledge in Spanish, Italian and German.</p>
Lecture summary	<p>The Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (1946) states: "... We (the Japanese people) desire to occupy an honored place in an international society designed and dedicated to the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance, for all time from the earth. ..."</p> <p>Well, then, what can you do in practice to occupy such a place in the international community? By what means and how?</p> <p>It is indeed important to voice what your concerns and what you want, and even more so to share a vision and build an alliance. But what if your vision is not shared with other actors, or not even within your own country? Are you ready to fight in isolation? Or, are you giving up? Is there a way in between? Good preparation at home, in advance of a negotiation, is a key to a successful outcome.</p>
Reading list	<p><a href="https://www.indeed.com/career-advice/career-development/negotiation-skills">https://www.indeed.com/career-advice/career-development/negotiation-skills</a> (a site rich in information and tips, owned by Recruit Holdings Co.LTD)</p> <p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341640882_Negotiation_skills">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341640882_Negotiation_skills</a> ( A good analytic overview on negotiation)</p> <p><a href="https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/international-negotiation-daily/intercultural-negotiation-does-the-batna-concept-translate/">https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/international-negotiation-daily/intercultural-negotiation-does-the-batna-concept-translate/</a> (An article on BATNA in intercultural settings)</p>



# 13

Pages 9 to 59 are references for Prof. Miyagishima's lecture

## Negotiation skills

INTERTEXTUALITY GROUP THINK GROUP  
MINIMAL GROUP TECHNIQUE CONCESSIONS FALL  
/TALL ORGANISATIONS RAGGED RIGHT STAKEH  
UNIFICATION GRAMMAR PUNCTUATION GENDER  
ERSHIP PHRASES PRESENTATION SKILLS ASSERT  
FLICT RESOLUTION MEDIA AND COMMUNICATI  
MUNICATION TEAM BUILDING DOCUMENT DE



## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

*After studying this chapter, you should be able to:*

- explain why negotiation is not always the preferred mode for resolving a situation of conflict or disagreement
- explain the nature of win–lose and win–win dynamics in conflicts
- understand the value of research
- define goals and bottom lines, and concessions, positions and interests
- determine whether territory and time scarcity or abundance is relevant in negotiation
- assess the role of publics or stakeholders in negotiation
- understand how to package offers in negotiation
- work better as an individual or as a member of a team in a negotiation situation
- understand the role of nonverbal communication and signalling in negotiation
- use listening skills, questioning skills and persuasive skills in negotiations
- understand the role of culture and gender in negotiations
- understand the importance of personal styles in negotiation
- identify and use strategies and tactics in negotiations
- identify and effectively use communication channels in negotiation situations
- create an effective plan for a variety of negotiation situations.



## What is negotiation?

Our professional and personal lives might well be more satisfying and successful if we could only improve our negotiation skills. What do we mean by negotiation? Dictionary definitions of the concept include:

- to confer with another or others in order to come to terms or reach an agreement
- mutual discussion and arrangement of the terms of a transaction or agreement
- to settle by discussion and bargaining.

Other terms for negotiation include haggling, bargaining, making deals, transacting, higgling, dickering and horse-trading. (The English word, incidentally, comes from the Latin *neg* [not] + *otium* [leisure], i.e. 'not at leisure', or simply 'business'.) In the eyes of many, it is a specialised skill used by diplomats, businesspeople and union leaders – interesting, but not that relevant to everyday life. In reality, it could be argued without too much exaggeration that negotiation *is* everyday life.

Everyone negotiates in all kinds of situations.

- A child tries to convince a parent to buy sweets in the supermarket.
- You try to persuade your flatmate to do the dishes, even though it is your turn, so you can go out.
- A union representative sits down with management for an annual review of wages and conditions.
- You are running late on an assignment and are thinking of approaching your lecturer for an extension.
- You are thinking of trading in a car and upgrading to a better one.
- A mother tries to get her young daughter to eat her vegetables or clean up her room.
- Friends try to decide which movie they will see tonight.
- An employee asks for a raise in salary.
- A consumer tries to get a better deal on a refrigerator from a salesperson.
- New acquaintances try to determine whether they will become friends or lovers.
- The representatives of two countries sit down to discuss border tensions and the threat of war.

All of these situations, along with countless others, involve negotiation.

Negotiation is a communication and problem-solving process built on a broad foundation of skills and knowledge. It is also one of the most popular and effective means of resolving conflicts and misunderstandings (figure 13.1). In this context, negotiation tends to be used when:


- conflicts are relatively simple
- conflicts are of a low intensity
- both parties are relatively equal in power (Bercovitch & Jackson 2001).

Of course, this covers a very wide range of situations, so it makes sense to learn all we can about negotiation processes, theory and skills. In this chapter we will be exposed to, and perhaps initially bemused by, the jargon of negotiation – buzz words, acronyms

and slang seem to litter the field. All this terminology, however, means very little unless we apply common sense in our approach to negotiation.



As foreign minister, Julie Bishop engages in negotiation on behalf of Australia.



**FIGURE 13.1** Approaches to conflicts or disputes

## Winning and losing: games and pies

Conflict has differing outcomes. These outcomes can be classified according to the jargon of a branch of mathematics called *game theory* (Schelling 1960; Kydd 1997; Geckil & Anderson 2009) (figure 13.2).

	I win	I lose
You win	(+) Positive sum	(0) Zero sum
You lose	(0) Zero sum	(-) Negative sum

**FIGURE 13.2** Win-lose dynamics of conflict  
Source: Emson (2002 [1997], p. 5).

**Zero-sum outcome:** a situation in which one person's gains equal another person's losses

**Negative-sum outcome:** a situation in which both parties lose

**Win-win situation:** a positive-sum outcome

**Positive-sum outcome:** a situation in which both parties win

If you and I are in a contest or a conflict situation, and one of us wins and one loses, then this is said to be a **zero-sum outcome**: my losses arithmetically cancel out your gains, producing zero. Sporting contests are typical zero-sum situations in which there can be only one winner (except in the case of a draw, which is usually perceived to be an unsatisfactory and temporary resolution). If we both lose (e.g. if we are both injured, or die, or lose something of value), this is called a **negative-sum outcome**. If we both win (if, say, we both gain something we want), this is called a **positive-sum outcome**, a **win-win situation**. Let's look at an example.

In an organisation, the sales department and the production department may fight over a limited source of funding in a given year. The conflict indicates that both sides see the situation as having a zero-sum outcome in which there can be only one winner and one loser. Yet if it can be shown that one department can help rather than hinder the other, then the situation changes: for example, if funds are allocated immediately to sales


and new orders from customers arrive, then this could help fund production increases. Similarly, if production increases are funded and a high-quality product can be put out in the marketplace, then the job of the sales department is made easier.

To take a further example, in another organisation, management and labour are haggling over wage increases. Management proposes a productivity and profit-sharing agreement: if new work practices boost output for similar amounts of input, then workers will receive above-normal pay increases while management gain increased profits.

Win-win dynamics can also prevail when, for example, two organisations, each with their own strengths or specialisations, negotiate a merger: the merged identity will combine the strengths of both to achieve what the organisations acting separately could never have achieved. The new super-organisation will have synergy, with its whole being greater than the sum of its parts (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders 2007, pp. 11–12).

It is not always possible to demonstrate a positive-sum outcome, but such a potential outcome is often overlooked when combatants are trapped in a zero-sum mindset.

Negotiation often concerns who gets what, or who gets what share. The metaphor of a pie or cake is often used. We normally conceive of a pie as a fixed resource – the size will not change. So the carve-up of the pie necessarily involves a zero-sum calculation: what you don't get, I get. Sometimes, however, it is possible to increase the size of the pie by creating new resources – for example, when different departments in an organisation help each other to maximise growth, or when cooperation instead of competition opens up new opportunities. Thus, 15 per cent of a bigger pie may be better than 25 per cent of a smaller pie (figure 13.3).



**FIGURE 13.3** Who gets what: pies and slices

## 'Win-win': not just a cliché

A 'win-win outcome' has become almost a cliché these days; for some people the term sounds like a 'feel good' piece of nonsense that has no place in the harsh world of winners and losers. Yet in negotiation, where there is a need for a resolution that has some chance of lasting, at least in the short or medium term, a Win-win or positive-sum outcome is not simply an ethical ideal, but a hard-nosed, 'must have' goal. No-one likes to lose, and losers, whether real or apparent, will have little incentive to honour any agreement that damages their interests. Consider how you feel when you lose: Do you like it? Do you want to change things so you can get out of a losing position?


One of the most difficult lessons we will have to learn in negotiation is that, in order for a lasting agreement to be reached, we may need to concede valuable things to people whom we do not necessarily like. This is not simply because of the power exerted by those people, or because they would have been able to extract those concessions from us anyway.

That is, we may have to give in order to get. This is because unless the people we are negotiating with feel that they 'own' the result, and that they have not lost face or suffered a defeat, we can be sure that the agreement is unlikely to last. Both parties need to take

something away from a negotiation, otherwise one party will leave feeling aggrieved, and a lasting resolution is unlikely to have been achieved. As a negotiating party, you need to put yourself in the other side's shoes: what's in it for them? If, for example, they lose face in front of the folks back home – their principals or constituency (a board of management, a union rank and file, a spouse or partner) – then they will resist (Whitford, Bottom, and Miller 2013). In other words, in order to win, we may have to lose a little or give to get.

For example, one side of a negotiation may attack so viciously that they win a great battle, but lose the war. They might need to negotiate with the other side (product suppliers, housemates, spouses, countries) down the track, at which time the other side might wish to return the win-lose favour. Unless you specifically wish to humiliate the other side, always allow them to save face, for you may need to cash in the favour one day. The wheel of fortune always turns – try not to be under it.

Figure 13.4 illustrates a simple model of the negotiation process.



**FIGURE 13.4** A model of negotiation

Source: Adapted from Eunson (2002 [1994], p. 3).

## WATNAS, BATNAS and Plan Bs

Our model begins with the simple decision point: should we negotiate or not? Negotiation usually takes place between two individuals, or groups of individuals – that is, two sides. As we're going to continually refer to the two sides in our exploration of the issues, we will use the abbreviations OS (our side) and TOS (the other side).

Negotiation is usually about giving something to get something:

- 'We won't pay you \$1.3 million for the business, but will you accept \$1.27 million?'
- 'If you eat your cabbage, *then* you can watch TV.'

It also implies that neither side has absolute power, because if it did, the absolutely powerful side could simply demand and get what it wanted without giving anything in return.

Negotiation, however, may not be the only way to achieve your aim. People negotiate only when they believe they will fare worse if they adopt other approaches. In spite of this, they may choose not to negotiate, and instead choose other approaches. It might be better – or at least seem to be better – to try to resolve a dispute by punching someone on the nose, or by going on strike, or by going to court, or by going to war, or by simply walking away. Such an alternative course of action is referred to as an ATNA (Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).

**BATNA:** (for Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) another choice or substitute action that may produce an outcome superior to any outcome we might gain from a negotiation process

**WATNA:** (for Worst Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) another choice or substitute action that may produce an outcome inferior to any outcome we might gain from a negotiation process

A **BATNA** (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) is another choice or substitute action that may produce an outcome superior to any outcome we might gain from a negotiation process. A **WATNA** (Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) is another choice or substitute action that may produce an outcome inferior to any outcome we might gain from a negotiation process.

We win with BATNAs and lose with WATNAs. BATNAs are a source of power, while WATNAs are a source of weakness (see table 13.1). The more likely that a side's WATNA will happen, the *more* likely it is that that side will negotiate. The more likely that a side's BATNA will happen, the *less* likely it is that that side will negotiate. In other words: *if BATNAs are likely, don't negotiate; if WATNAs are likely, negotiate.*

**TABLE 13.1** BATNAs and WATNAs

Situation	WATNA	BATNA
<b>A person is thinking of buying a used car from a car yard.</b>	Keep driving current faulty vehicle until it breaks down.	Buy direct from other owners who advertise their vehicles in newspapers or online, cutting out the cost of the middleman.
<b>Country A receives military threats from country B.</b>	Country A is invaded and occupied permanently by country B.	Country B depends on oil revenues to wage war. The price of oil declines dramatically, as country A's intelligence predicted. Country B stops making threats.
<b>Union wants a 30 per cent wage increase.</b>	Union goes on strike, even though strike fund has been embezzled by corrupt official.	Market value of company stock suddenly rises. All employees have stock, so become wealthier as a result. Union representatives decide to defer claims until better organised and resourced.
<b>Two lovers cannot agree over who is to pay a restaurant bill.</b>	No-one pays and the restaurant owner calls the police.	The restaurant owner, a romantic at heart, tells them the food is on the house.

When planning for negotiation, you should try to brainstorm as many BATNAs as possible, just as you should try to brainstorm as many different alternative negotiation approaches as possible. The more **Plan Bs** you have, the greater your flexibility and the lower your stress levels will be in the negotiation itself. The fewer Plan Bs you have, the more vulnerable and therefore stressed you will be.

**Plan B:** alternative course of action that can give you flexibility in negotiations

Do not despair, however, for there are likely to be more Plan Bs than you initially believe is the case. The various factors we are about to consider in the negotiating process are fertile sources of Plan Bs through to Plan Zs. Always strive to create options and alternative courses of action, rather than locking yourself into one or a limited range of plans.

Above all else, be realistic in your assessment of the possible outcome of any negotiation. Because so many people are unrealistic (often because they have not done enough research), we may need to compromise so that we may end up with one or more

**MLATNA:** (Most Likely Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) another choice or substitute action that may produce an outcome superior to any outcome we might gain from a negotiation process — usually less extreme and more realistic than some BATNAs and WATNAs

**PATNA:** (Probable Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) — same as MLATNA

of the other conflict resolution strategies of figure 13.1. Some negotiation researchers have, therefore, suggested we also bear in mind a **MLATNA** (Most Likely Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (Guasco and Robinson 2007) or **PATNA** (Probable Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (Wade 2008).

### ASSESS YOURSELF

Using the table that follows (or a copy), analyse at least two real or imaginary situations in terms of BATNAs and WATNAs.

Situation	WATNA	BATNA

## Avoidance

A strong BATNA allows one side in a negotiation to refuse even to start negotiating. But the other side may not wish to negotiate for other reasons. For example, consider the following situations (adapted from Wallihan 1998; Spector 1998).

- A country is intent on developing nuclear weapons, but it is under pressure from other nations not to do so. The country plays for time by entering into negotiations, giving the public impression of bargaining on outcomes but in reality having no intention of negotiating.
- A person on a job selection panel sees the outstanding candidate as a potential threat to his position. Rather than state the true position, or be seen as unreasonably rejecting the candidate, he instead offers the candidate an insultingly low starting salary and package, which is duly rejected.
- A prosecutor perceives that an upcoming jury trial will give her much media exposure, and will thus boost her career. Because of this, she only goes through the motions of negotiating a settlement before the case goes to court, and she finally rejects such a settlement.
- Party A rejects negotiating with party B because party A says that party B is a villain who should never be negotiated with.
- Refusal to negotiate, or ‘phoney bargaining’, constitutes a major blockage to the negotiation process. Some counters are as follows (Wallihan 1998).
- Name the game: identify the tactics being used; accuse the other side of not being serious – of going through the motions and only being interested in making offers that must be refused.
- Appeal to those behind the other side (e.g. the union rank and file, the board and shareholders, the car yard owner, the other parent).
- Bring in a third party.
- Shift the negotiation to issues on which real bargaining is more likely to take place.

## Choosing approaches

Once we choose – or are forced – to negotiate, we need to avoid just wading in unthinkingly. If we do not want to lose, we need to plan.



## Research or sniffing around

The essence of all good negotiation is preparation, and the essence of all good preparation is research. You will need to try to predict the behaviour of TOS, and you can do that by constructing theories about them. First, though, you need facts. As Sherlock Holmes said to Dr Watson, 'I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories instead of theories to suit facts'. Of course, we can never predict other people's behaviour with certainty, but it still usually helps to try. What do you really know about TOS? Research can sometimes be quite uncomplicated: it may mean simply sitting quietly and thinking, and not allowing your understanding of the situation to be clouded by wishful thinking or distorted perceptions. For example, if you want to try to persuade your flatmate to do the dishes when it's actually your turn, you will need to think about what you might offer in return in order to make this happen, but you will also need to think carefully about what you know of your flatmate's character, not to mention your own track record of reliability.

In more complex negotiation situations, research is commensurately more complex. In an industrial relations setting, for example, you will need to consider a wide range of points: Is the other side in a growth phase or in decline? Are they flush with funds or verging on bankruptcy? What is their industrial relations record like? What is their position within the wider industry? Do the people you are likely to face across the table have the personal health and stamina to stand up to the stresses of a protracted negotiation? Are they liked or disliked within their own organisation? Why, or why not? What about the other 'other sides' (i.e. your competitors, who also want to sell or buy)? What do you know about them, and what they are offering or demanding?

In these more complex negotiation situations, such data can be obtained from company reports, government documents, the media, the grapevines or rumour mills within TOS, or in the wider industry or community, and from people within your own organisation who have had prior experience dealing with TOS. You can also formally ask TOS for data: so long as it is not self-incriminating, there should be no overwhelming reason why they cannot provide you with information, particularly if the gesture is reciprocated.


## Goals

Once we have our basic data, we can begin to plan. We need to clarify things about our own side too, and make some informed guesses about how each side's position relates to the other's. What are both sides trying to achieve? What motivates me? What will I be happy with? What exactly are we trying to achieve in this negotiation? These are fundamental questions, but they are not asked as often as they should be, and they should always be asked *before* negotiations rather than during or after them.

Remember the old saying, 'Don't wish too hard for something, because you might end up getting it'. In other words, we sometimes lose by winning, and win by losing. A person may use brilliant negotiation skills to secure a new job and a salary increase – and be dead from the stress within a year. Another person may successfully negotiate a switch in shifts with a workmate – and as a result miss meeting his dream partner. Negotiating success is not proof against life's ironies.

## Positions, fallbacks and bottom lines

Let's now look at another model of negotiation (figure 13.5). Here the two sides in a negotiation (OS and TOS) are like ships in the night, moving in opposite directions. If there is to be any trade or transaction between them, the negotiators need to understand the structure of motivations and needs of both sides.



**FIGURE 13.5** Two sides trying to reach agreement  
 Source: Emsun (2002 [1994], p. 7)

What will the opening positions be? Will OS open high ('We won't take a penny less than \$4000?') or low ('We think \$3000 is a reasonable figure. What do you say?')? Will TOS concentrate on price, or will they try to put together a package that involves price, service, spare parts and training?

**Bottom line:** point beyond which no more concessions can be made to the other side without damaging our side's assets and position (also known as *fallback position, limit or resistance point*)

In considering people's positions, we need to know, or speculate on, their fallback position, **bottom line**, limit or resistance point. This is the irreducible minimum point beyond which a negotiator will not or cannot go, because to do so would spell failure. A negotiator will often try to conceal information about this point, although there may be a tactical advantage in deliberately announcing what it is.

How does one reach the bottom line? One reaches it, with varying degrees of unwillingness, by making concessions to TOS.

## Concessions


**Concession:** something that can be given to the other side, usually in return for something else (also known as *tradeables*)

**Concessions**, or tradeables, are things or assets that you can give to the other side, such as the following.

- I will do the dishes for you.
- You can watch the TV program you want to watch.
- You can have my dessert.
- You can have a \$20/week wage increase for your union members.
- We will work overtime at reduced rates.
- You can have the disputed section of land.

A fair trade usually means that each side concedes or yields a number of things to the other. An unfair trade means that one side concedes more than the other side. Generally speaking, the less power or leverage a side has, the more that side will concede. The more you have to sacrifice in the way of concessions or tradeables, the more painful and damaging it will be to your situation.

Concessions can be cheap or expensive, but they may be perceived differently by each side. Ideally, what is of little importance to you (a cheap concession) may be highly desirable to TOS. By conceding it, you want something in return and are now in a position to ask for it (figure 13.6). The worst case situation, of course, is where you attempt to trade something that is expensive or valuable for you, but is not desirable or valuable for the other side.



**FIGURE 13.6** Analysing concessions or tradeables

In trading concessions with the other side, remember these guidelines:

- trade what's cheap for you and what is valuable for the other side
- never make a concession without getting something in return (Kennedy, Benson & Macmillan 1984).

**Trading concessions: trade what's cheap for you and what is valuable for the other side**

**Situation 1**

Freddy is furious with himself. His favourite band, Rama, is coming to town, but through his own procrastination he has missed out on tickets for their only show. 'My life is chaotic. I've got to get organised', he tells himself, and in a frenzy of self-punishment, he begins to clean up his flat. The housework is interrupted by the arrival of his friend Joe. They chat

aimlessly for a while, then Joe pulls out two front-row seats for the Rama concert, crowing about his success in getting them. Freddy is about to abuse Joe for having the tickets, but then thinks better of it.

'Oh, they're an OK band, I suppose', he concedes, moving to block Joe's view of the collection of Rama records on his shelves.

'Hey, look at this!', says Joe, picking up some magazines that Freddy was going to throw out: *Cold (The Super-Cool Magazine)*, *Yob (For Men of the World)* and *Ghoul (For Connoisseurs of Road Accidents)*. 'Hey, could you sell me some of these? I've been after these numbers for years!', says Joe.

Freddy thinks quickly. 'Well, they are part of my special collection, of course . . . I'd hate to see them go . . . Tell you what, though . . . my girl Marie is a big fan of Rama, even though I can take 'em or leave 'em . . . how about four issues of whatever you want for your tickets?'

Joe looks confused, then annoyed, then looks back at the magazines. He smiles slowly. 'OK, it's a deal!'

### Situation 2

Soula, the union rep, knows that the Despatch section of the office can perform much better than they currently are. In fact, most of the staff in that section are bored with their work. Barry, the manager, has told Soula in no uncertain terms that he wants greater productivity out of the Processing section, where Soula knows there is not much room for improvement, and where a much-loved older worker is ill but is being protected by her peers. In a productivity meeting with Barry and other management staff, Soula moves quickly to offer productivity improvements in the Despatch section in return for a pay increase, and a promise to look at the Processing section after a trial period to see how the Despatch section deal works out.

### Situation 3

Two countries, Freedonia and Tyrannia, are haggling over a disputed tract of land. The chief negotiator for Freedonia doesn't think much of the land; the Central Lands Department has already used Freedonia's 'special friendship' with superpower Vespuccia to get satellite surveys of the land done, and these surveys have revealed no mineral deposits of value, even though the landscape looks like classic oil country. Freedonia is in urgent need of water, which Tyrannia has in abundance. Freedonia's negotiator notes the body language of the Tyrannian negotiators; they really want this land. He decides to 'reluctantly' relinquish control over the Freedonian section of the land on the condition that Tyrannia provides water through a pipeline for 20 years for free.

## Positions versus interests

The 'ships in the night' model of negotiation presented in figure 13.5 can be very useful when planning for a negotiation. It helps us to see that bottom lines, opening positions and concessions are vital to the horse-trading that takes place in many negotiations. This model accurately describes what is sometimes called **distributive bargaining** – that is, a negotiating process in which the two sides try to concede as little as possible and to gain as much as they can, using a zero-sum model of whatever it is that is being haggled over.

We should also be aware, however, of another model of negotiation, which is called **integrative bargaining**. The integrative bargaining approach means moving beyond a least-worst outcome for one or both sides, or from a *positions-based* approach to an *interests-based* approach. It may be, that is, that what people *say* they want is not what they need. The position they assume (and will not budge from, or can only be persuaded from with concessions) may not correspond to their interests. In other words, negotiation may not be a simple linear process, a tug of war, but something more multidimensional

**Distributive bargaining:** a negotiating process in which the two sides try to concede as little as possible and to gain as much as they can – a zero-sum approach, using a positions-based approach rather than an interests-based approach

**Integrative bargaining:** a bargaining approach in which the negotiators try to move from a positions-based approach to an interests-based approach

(Ury & Patton 2011; Wheeler & Waters 2006; Da Conceição-Heldt 2006; Lewicki, Barry, Bruce and Saunders 2015).

Consider, for example, the following circumstances.

1. Two sisters argue over an orange. Both want it, but upon discussion they discover that one wants it for the juice, and the other wants the peel for a cake.
2. Two students are working in the library. One wants the window open, and the other wants it shut. Upon discussion they discover that one wants fresh air, while the other wants to lay out papers without having them blown about by the draft. The solution is to open a window in the adjacent room.
3. Two tribes go to war over access to a river. During a truce they discover that one side wants water for irrigation of crops, while the other side wants access to the best fishing spot.
4. Two managers feud over who is to get a corner office. Upon discussion they find that one really likes the view, while the other perceives that a corner office would confer prestige. A solution may be to give the office to the manager who simply wants the view, and give the other manager another office along with – resources permitting – a new title and real or symbolic extra responsibilities.

In all these situations, if both sides in the dispute dig in on positions, then settlement may be difficult and will probably entail a win-lose resolution. As very few of us like losing, and we usually resolve to right wrongs by reversing any agreement reached, win-lose outcomes are notoriously unstable and short-lived. If mutually beneficial outcomes can be created that satisfy both sides' underlying interests, however, then integrative, win-win solutions are possible (table 13.2).

**TABLE 13.2** Integrative bargaining: some solutions

Position	Interest	Mutually satisfactory solution (win-win)	Interest	Position
I want ...	because ...	Common ground	because ...	I want ...
Orange	I want juice	One gets peel, the other gets fruit	I want peel	Orange
Window open	I want fresh air	Open window in adjacent room	Papers will get blown around if windows are open	Windows closed
Access to river	I want irrigation water	One gets irrigation runoff, one gets fishing spot	I want fish	Access to river
Corner office	I like view	One gets office, one gets new title/responsibilities	I like prestige	Corner office

In each of these cases, both sides win 100 per cent – a statistical impossibility if we are talking about limited resources, but not necessarily so if we redefine what a resource is. A 50–50, distributive or straight compromise outcome (e.g. each sister gets half of the unpeeled orange) would be unsatisfactory to both sides.

Is win-win always possible? No, but it is certainly highly desirable, because it satisfies natural justice and has a good chance of providing a permanent resolution.

Editor's Note: 3 lines short

## ASSESS YOURSELF

Using the following table, analyse at least two conflict situations in terms of positions and interests.

Position	Interest	Mutually satisfactory solution (win-win)	Interest	Position
I want ...	Because ...	Common ground	Because ...	I want ...

## WHAT PEOPLE SAY ABOUT NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is not a policy. It's a technique. It's something you use when it's to your advantage, and something that you don't use when it's not to your advantage.

*John Bolton*

Negotiation means getting the best of your opponent.

*Marvin Gaye*

All government — indeed, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act — is founded on compromise and barter.

*Edmund Burke*

Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

*John F Kennedy*

Don't negotiate with yourself. Have the patience to wait for the other fellow to make a counter-offer after you've made one.

*Richard Smith*

When you are skinning your customers you should leave some skin on to grow again so that you can skin them again.

*Nikita Krushchev*

The worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. That makes the other guy smell blood, and then you're dead. The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have. Leverage is having something the other guy wants. Or better yet, needs. Or, best of all, simply can't do without.

*Donald Trump*

Victor and vanquished never unite in substantial agreement.


*Tacitus*

## Investing time in uncovering interests

People are not always aware that positions are not the same as interests, and indeed they may not have thought through the question of just what their interests are. We can't read minds; then how can we know what the other side is thinking so we can move beyond positions to uncover common interests? In negotiations, as in most human interactions, the other side is a partial mystery to us, just as we are a partial mystery to the other side. Using the Johari window model (see Luft 1969 and chapter 10 'Interpersonal skills 2'), let's now develop some models (figures 13.7–13.9) of how we might explore these situations.

We can find out a good deal about the other side by research, but that can still yield only a limited amount of knowledge. If we are to uncover common interests, we have to slow down the pace and use listening, questioning, feedback and other communication skills to open up the area of common understanding between the sides. If we do not do this – for


example, if one or both sides is impatient, or if one or both sides thinks negotiation is only about shouting out some or all of the opening positions – then not much real negotiation will take place (figure 13.7).




**FIGURE 13.7** A matrix model of negotiation

We have to be patient, and often we will need to set aside some of our feelings (e.g. when we are negotiating with people we do not like). By doing these things we increase our chances of opening up areas of communication and discovering areas of common interest (figures 13.8 and 13.9). Otherwise, we might find ourselves afflicted with the **'winner's curse'** – paying too much for something because we did not have as much information as TOS to bid accurately – 'buyer, beware'. The more quickly TOS accepts our offer, the more likely we are to suspect we are victims of the curse (Freshman & Guthrie 2009; Grosskopf & Bazerman 2007; Costa-Font, McGuire and Stanley 2013).

**Winner's curse:** the perception that we have got the bad part of a deal; usually because we were full of enthusiasm but short on information



**FIGURE 13.8** A matrix model of an unhealthy negotiation



**FIGURE 13.9** A matrix model of a healthy negotiation situation

The positions/interests distinction is undoubtedly a useful one, and can be useful in managing real negotiations (see McKersie, Eaton & Kochan 2004). Nevertheless, we must be careful not to push it too far. For example, Provis suggests that the distinction can be misleading in some cases and wrong in others, in that it may lead to a confusion in meaning, it may be divisive, and it may ignore other functions of positions, such as negotiating team discipline:

The suggestion that one attends to interests rather than positions is rather like an injunction to attend to people's meanings rather than to the words they actually use. It is normally an error to attend to the words to the exclusion of their meaning, but that does not imply that we can concentrate on meaning without attending to the words. To concentrate on interests rather than positions implies that we ought to concentrate on what people really want, rather than on what they say they want. That is reasonable, but what people say they want may be a major source of information about what they really want . . .

Encouraging people to turn away from positions to concentrate on interests may encourage attention to individual interests at the expense of collective interests. To that extent, (the positions/interests distinction) may unintentionally serve a strong and long-established vein of anti-union sentiment in United States business and legal culture . . . a position [may be] important for group cohesion . . . In general, labour unions rely more strongly on a common position than business firms do, because the unity of the latter is more strongly sustained by institutional and legal structures. (Provis 1996, pp. 313–16)

Note also Hofstede's (2001) critique of the positions/interests model.

## Territory and negotiation

The factors we have considered so far help us identify *what* we are negotiating about and *how* we will negotiate. But what about *where*? Should it be on our own territory, on their territory or on neutral ground? Sometimes it doesn't matter, but sometimes the issue is a complex one, and the fate of a negotiation process may be determined by the apparently trivial question of venue: history here is determined by geography. For example, consider the following situations.



- Two lovers are arguing on the telephone. After a heated exchange, they agree that they should try to deal with these relationship issues face to face. ‘OK, you come over here’, says one. ‘No, you come over here’, says the other.
- Two countries are at war. They decide to hold truce talks, but elect to meet in a third country, thousands of kilometres away.
- Two companies are planning a merger, but there is still considerable mistrust on both sides. The CEOs decide that they will take both sets of staff to an island resort to continue the discussions.
- Social welfare workers note that their clients often seem intimidated by the formal surroundings of the department’s offices. The welfare workers decide that they will try to put their clients at ease by visiting them in their homes. This solves some problems but seems to create new ones.

Let’s now look at the pros and cons of negotiating in different territories (table 13.3).

**TABLE 13.3** Territory and negotiations

	For	Against
<b>Our place</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Familiarity</li> <li>■ Control of environment (furniture, timing of breaks, security, access of media)</li> <li>■ Access to experts, support personnel, superiors/principals for consultation, authorisation</li> <li>■ Access to resources (e.g. for quickly writing up agreement documents)</li> <li>■ Can do ‘show and tell’ (e.g. tour of plant/ office)</li> <li>■ Can do other work when not at the table</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Obligation to behave in generous fashion</li> <li>■ Greater pressure from constituents, internal opponents and local media</li> <li>■ Proximity to principals a two-edged sword — harder to create delays</li> <li>■ More difficult to walk out</li> <li>■ TOS might be shown and told too much</li> </ul>
<b>Their place</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Can deviate from instructions, be flexible, bend the rules — ‘difficulties’ in communicating with home</li> <li>■ Can delay, pleading necessity to consult, get other information</li> <li>■ Easier to use limited authority tactic</li> <li>■ Easier to walk out</li> <li>■ Gives visitors chance to find out about TOS</li> <li>■ Can be seen as a magnanimous gesture, which places obligation on TOS</li> <li>■ Easier to appeal over head of TOS to their principals</li> <li>■ Can conduct other business while there</li> <li>■ Can concentrate fully without interruptions from home or housekeeping problems</li> <li>■ Can use deadline tactic</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Unfamiliarity with surroundings</li> <li>■ Possibly higher stress, lowered performance</li> <li>■ Greater distance from advisers and superiors/principals</li> <li>■ High cost — travel, accommodation</li> <li>■ TOS can still perform many normal work functions; OS cannot</li> <li>■ Delays can be created, putting pressure on OS to agree — deadline tactic used against OS</li> <li>■ Reliance on good will of TOS may create obligation</li> <li>■ May weaken OS — symbolism of TOS’s ownership of site may make transaction seem unequal</li> </ul>
<b>Another place</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Neither side has special advantages</li> <li>■ If hostility is high, may be only place — symbolism</li> <li>■ May be more conducive to reaching agreement (e.g. combining business with pleasure)</li> <li>■ When a third party has a vested interest</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ May be difficult to check with principals</li> <li>■ May lack resources</li> <li>■ Complicates process by introducing a third party</li> <li>■ Host may have ulterior motives — bias, seeking kudos</li> </ul>

Source: Adapted with permission from Salacuse and Rubin (1990).

## Our place: what's good

There are obvious 'home ground' advantages, of course: the surroundings are familiar to you but not to TOS; you know where everything is. You have control of the environment: you decide everything – from the location of furniture in the negotiating room to the timing of breaks, the security and access of the media to the event. Just down the corridor, or up a flight or two, you have a resource base of experts and support personnel, and you can consult quickly with your principals or constituency, and get additional authorisation from them if needed. You have the resources to quickly write up agreement documentation. This means documentation can be prepared according to your house style – a subtle form of ownership or influence. It may also confer a tactical advantage if you are trying to speed up the process or if you plan to write the documentation in such a way as to gain an edge.

Being on your home ground can also have advantages if you are trying to impress TOS with your capabilities; for example, your ability to meet commitments to produce a commodity. You can lead a tour of your facilities – you will, of course, have briefed your people in advance. Such 'show and tell' can be a useful piece of theatre.

Finally, you can conduct normal business when you are not actually sitting at the negotiating table; and even then you may, if the occasion presents itself, see to other work, either openly or surreptitiously.

## Our place: what's not so good

There are home ground disadvantages, however. Being a host can place you in a role of power over your guests, but it also gives them power over you: you must look after their needs; you will be expected to behave in a generous manner, and this expectation may filter down to the pattern of concession making that is integral to all negotiations.

You are also exposed directly to pressure from your constituency, who may cramp your style by 'looking over your shoulder' too often for your liking. All organisations are pluralistic, political structures, so it would not be surprising if there were insiders opposed to what you are trying to achieve in the negotiation process. These opponents will be uncomfortably close. If the negotiations are of interest to the media, you will have the local media to contend with: while foreign media in another place may be easy to fool and shake off, local media may prove to be more interested in and informed about what's going on, and persistent. They may be more adept and/or devious in dealing with you than would be the case if you were dealing with foreign media in another place.

Because you are on home ground, you are also prevented from using certain tactics. A theatrical but sometimes effective tactic is to walk out, either temporarily or permanently; if you are on home ground, however, you are placed in the same position as the party host with obnoxious guests – the host simply cannot walk out in disgust.

A number of other negotiating tactics are now suddenly unavailable to you. You can't call for a prolonged delay to consult with your principals, because they're just down the hall (and the purpose of the tactic is to maximise delay while you think things through, or perhaps simply to exasperate TOS). You can't say you don't have the authority to negotiate beyond a certain point, because that authority problem can be solved instantly by inviting your principals in (and in all probability they don't want to be invited in, because they want you to use your limited authority to create delays, and therefore have instructed you to use the limited authority tactic in the first place).

The visitors, on the other hand, can nose around, see things as they actually are, and evaluate your actual capacities. Can you really deliver on the promises you are making in the artificial environment of the negotiation room? If you have something to hide, then a 'show and tell' tour may be one the dumbest things you could do, and even without such a circus TOS will still gather a lot of intelligence just by keeping their eyes and ears open.

## Their place: what's good

Travelling to TOS's turf can have a number of advantages. Principals, constituencies or publics can cramp a negotiator's style by their presence on the home ground – the *back-seat driver effect* – but when the negotiator is free of their immediate oversight, then he or she has much more flexibility to operate. After making a prudent evaluation of the risks of doing so, the negotiator can depart from the script and operate in a more flexible way, bending the rules where necessary. If challenged on this on returning home, the negotiator can cite 'difficulties' in communicating with home about every little detail.

Being away from home also makes it easier for the negotiator to delay, pleading the necessity to consult with home and/or get further information. It is also easier to use the authority and walk-out tactics. If TOS has something to hide, you may detect it when you are on their turf. The most potent forms of industrial espionage are often undertaken quite openly: you just have to look and listen. What you discover may convince you that your hosts are honourable and capable, but it may also convince you of the opposite.

Travelling to alien territory can sometimes be seen as a sign of weakness – the supplicant travelling to the master – but, depending on the situation and the way you choose to play it, the reverse perception can occur. Travelling may be seen as a sign of strength – a magnanimous gesture that obligates TOS (e.g. US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, or Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1978 to negotiate with Israel).

Just as it is easier for you to use the limited authority tactic on alien ground, it is harder for TOS to use it. In fact, you may have the option of appealing over the heads of the negotiators you are dealing with by walking down the corridor to talk to the power people yourself. They may not want to see you for tactical reasons, but if you believe that TOS is obstructing things, and is not operating in the principals' best interests, the principals may be interested in hearing this.

While you're in town or in the neighbourhood, you may be able to transact other business, renew contacts, plug into other networks, or simply gossip to maintain old relationships. Further, while your hosts have the advantage of not being far from their routine milieu, this can also be a millstone for them: there may be interruptions, and the interrupters may not understand the importance of the negotiation proceedings. Then there are the normal housekeeping problems of running a negotiation (the lunch hasn't shown up, the VCR has broken down), and this eats into TOS's time and concentration. None of these problems besets the visitor, who can concentrate totally on the substance of the negotiation.

Finally, when visiting, you can use the deadline or stampede tactic: I've got to leave by this hour or that day, so hurry up and settle (on terms that favour me).

## Their place: what's not so good

What are the negative aspects of operating on their turf? Your relative unfamiliarity with the environment can be unsettling. Being away from home can be a lonely and stressful experience, and this may impair your performance; it may, for instance, motivate you to get out quicker and settle for terms that are less favourable than you would have otherwise preferred. Distance means it is more difficult, if not impossible, to draw on the advice of experts and superiors, and to get additional authority to proceed. It is also expensive to travel and to use accommodation, especially where teams of negotiators are concerned.

Although you can use the deadline tactic against TOS, it is quite possible to have the tables turned on you: if TOS creates delays, then it is you, not they, who are up against the deadline, under pressure to concede more than you would 'had [you] but world enough and time'.

Hospitality is a ritual of mutual obligation: while the host is obligated to behave generously to the guest, guests are also beholden to the host for inviting them in the first place. This may translate into the expectation of concessions to TOS.

Finally, there is the symbolism of ownership of territory: it may appear (and may in fact be) that by travelling to another site OS has already relinquished an advantage to TOS, and has therefore taken on an inferior role.

### Another place: what's good

What is the best way of circumventing the problem of our place versus their place? One solution is to alternate venues for each meeting. Another is to meet at a third, neutral site where neither side has special advantages. If hostility between the negotiating parties is strong, a neutral site may be unavoidable: the symbolic overtones of one side approaching the other might simply prove unacceptable.

Neutral ground may also have the advantage of offering a pleasant environment – architecture, climate, facilities – more conducive to reaching agreement. Both sides may be in a better frame of mind when business and pleasure are agreeably combined. Third parties (e.g. financiers or investors in the deal) are often involved in negotiations and may request or even demand that the proceedings take place on their territory.

### Another place: what's not so good

Some of the downsides to negotiating at a third venue are similar to the downsides of negotiating at TOS's place. It may be difficult to check with your principals, for example, or the site may lack resources. Further, introducing a third party may unduly complicate matters. Third parties may have ulterior motives: rather than being genuinely neutral, they may be secretly partial to one side and seek to influence the outcome accordingly. There is often kudos and prestige attached to the role of the disinterested mediator, and the host may try to garner public relations benefits from this role.

## Time and negotiation

Is time a significant factor? Is time abundant or scarce? Can one side stampede the other by the use of deadlines? Does TOS operate within a culture that perceives time differently from

OS? Is there a need to invest time in the process, so that rapport and empathy (Planken 2005; Martinovsky, Traum & Marsella 2007) can be built, trust developed and positions uncovered? The real or perceived scarcity or abundance of time during a negotiation can be vital in securing (or destroying) a positive outcome (Alon & Brett 2007; Crump 2007). McDuff argues that the effect of time on negotiations can be broken down into three categories:

1. Punctuality and timeliness – the importance or lack of importance placed on being 'on time' and getting the negotiations under way
2. The use of time – the overall length of the negotiation and how such activities as relationship building, story telling, etc. are prioritised in terms of how much time is allotted to them
3. Time as an issue within the negotiation – how far back in history does the discussion of relevant events, conflicts, grievances, etc. go? How far into the future do possible remedies extend? (McDuff 2006, p. 40).

We also need to be aware of behavioural patterns (on all sides) of procrastination and crisis management that will bear directly on all aspects of the negotiation process, but particularly the preparation phases (Stuhlmacher and Champagne, 2000).



Punctuality can affect the success of a negotiation.

## Publics and negotiation

The publics or stakeholders surrounding the negotiation also need to be factored into our consideration. What impacts will flow from a given outcome, and who will those impacts affect? For example, a negotiation involving unions and management at a factory may result in an impasse or deadlock, which is resolved only by increasing wages and profits at the expense of increased prices: the community and consumer watchdogs may denounce the cosy agreement of the two sides, leading to negative public relations outcomes for all who work at the factory. Stakeholders in any decision are usually more numerous and less apparent than a first glance might suggest.

A key public for negotiators is the principals. Most negotiators are operating as agents representing others, such as the board of directors, or the union membership, or the electorate, or the client selling the house or car or antique. These principals, or main constituencies, rarely grant the negotiators complete authority to close a deal without some kind of consultation (in fact, withholding that authority may be a conscious tactic, and a tactic that the negotiator is sometimes happy to employ).

In planning, the negotiator and the principal may work out approaches together. In some circumstances, the negotiator may need to develop a strategy for working around the principal, perhaps even keeping the principal in the dark, if it is believed that a 'back-seat driver' could do more harm than good. In simple negotiating situations, of course, agents are often not involved. When you sell your car to me, we are both acting as principals, not agents (although we might experience principal-like pressure from spouses, friends and bank managers) (Whitford, Bottom and Miller 2013).

## Stress and negotiation

Negotiations can be stressful, not least because some negotiators deliberately try to create stress as a tactic. In negotiation, as in public speaking, one of the best means of stress management is preparation: the more you know about negotiation, and the more you have prepared for it, the less likely it is you will experience stress. *Fail to plan, plan to fail; succeed in planning, plan to succeed.*

## Packaging and negotiation

These days, when people apply for new positions, their main concern is not simply the salary, but rather the *package*: salary plus extras (which for professionals can often be more substantial than the salary itself). So, too, with negotiation: what may be most important is not the immediately quantifiable factors (e.g. the price or wage increase, or settlement), but other factors.

Ferris (2001), for example, notes:

Unfortunately, for the amateur negotiator, (a) single-minded focus on price is just what the experienced bargainer wants to see when looking across the table. Like the magician, the bargaining pro often counts on the other side to focus on one thing, so that he or she can do so much more in the negotiation, just out of the line of sight. So, to really know the tricks of the bargaining table trade, you have to look beyond the raw price and pay attention to the When, How and Who of the Money deal.

To negotiate effectively, especially over money in its various disguises, you need to uncover more, not fewer, options, and an understanding of packaging offers (as presented by your side or TOS) gives you many more options. Table 13.4 outlines some examples of packaging.

**TABLE 13.4** Packaging deals in negotiation

<b>When do they get the money?</b>	
<b>Upon signing a contract</b>	Money and other rewards as a signing bonus can cover start-up costs (e.g. debts), can help moderate long-term salary demands elsewhere in the negotiation, and can protect the buyer from competitors luring away talent (by requiring full or partial repayment of the bonus if the employee wants to move on).
<b>After the freebies</b>	Free goods and services are offered as incentives to close a deal. For example, a landlord may offer 'free rent' to close a deal: the tenant can use the money that would have been spent on rent to cover debts and to invest elsewhere, while the landlord may derive the benefit of getting cash flow in a new tax year, and use the guarantee of cash flow as collateral on loans.
<b>In response to market indexes</b>	Money is sometimes linked to performance, but sometimes to other factors, too: workers may negotiate a cost-of-living allowance, linked to inflation rates, while a builder may cut a deal with a customer that links the final price of a building to an index of building and/or labour costs.
<b>How do they get the money?</b>	
<b>In cash</b>	Cash is usually very appealing, but not always: for example, the tax penalties of a sudden boost in cash can be a disincentive, and cash offers made to shareholders in takeover bids have sometimes not proved effective because shareholders believed there were few good places to invest cash in an already saturated market.
<b>To play the tax angle</b>	An offer in a wage bargaining situation might be for nontaxable benefits, such as health fund payments, or payable at a later date, or deferred in segments, to maximise tax advantages.
<b>Guaranteed future earnings</b>	Instead of offering cash in wage increases, an employer may offer locked-in job security for a specific period.
<b>Who gets the money?</b>	
<b>Third parties</b>	In a US airlines negotiation, salary was linked to the size of aeroplanes being flown, with older pilots flying the bigger craft. The airline paid the older pilots retirement packages so that younger pilots could move to bigger aircraft and be eligible for bigger salaries. A logging company avoided issues of blame and responsibility in a lawsuit by donating money to a university forestry program.
<b>Related entities</b>	If corporate tax rates are lower than individual taxes, it may make sense to make payments to a person's company than to that person.
<b>Creditors</b>	A negotiator may offer to take on debt and then renegotiate the terms of that debt with the creditor, or exchange something of value for that debt.

Source: Based on and adapted from Ferris (2001, pp. 47–58).

## Choosing people

Once we have done our research and planning, we need to choose our people. The main decision to make is whether to use a single negotiator or a team. This can be a complex decision. If we are simply negotiating for ourselves, the question doesn't arise. Teams of negotiators experience the advantages and disadvantages of teams in all situations. Members of negotiating teams can back each other up, each providing specialised knowledge and skills the others lack; they can cooperate in implementing particular tactics; and can provide moral support and strength in numbers. On the other hand, members of negotiating teams may undermine each other, accidentally or deliberately, and may prolong the negotiation, making it unwieldy and chaotic.

## Choosing tools

The numerous tools the negotiator can bring to bear on the negotiation process include nonverbal sensitivity; listening, questioning and persuasive and signalling skills; strategies and tactics; cultural and gender sensitivity; and familiarity with communication channels.

### Nonverbal sensitivity

The complete negotiator is the complete communicator. A negotiator has to be aware not only of what is being said, but also of what is unsaid – in other words, the many aspects of nonverbal communication, such as posture, gesture, eye contact, clothing and so forth (not to mention deliberately false nonverbal communication or body language when used as a tactic).

### Listening and questioning skills

A good negotiator needs to be a good listener, alert for hidden meanings and able simply to concentrate on what is said, setting aside all else. Importantly, as the following two quotations illustrate, the good negotiator also knows how to ask questions:

Statements generate resistance, whereas questions generate answers. Questions allow the other side to get their points across and let you understand them. They pose challenges and can be used to lead the other side to confront the problem. Questions offer them no target to strike at, no position to attack. Questions do not criticize, they educate. (Fisher & Ury and Patton 2011, p. 117)

We [Americans] don't teach our students how to ask questions, how to get information, how to listen, or how to use questioning as a powerful persuasive tactic. Yet these latter skills are critical at the international negotiating table. Few of us realize that, in most places in the world, the one who asks the questions controls the process of negotiation and thereby accomplishes more in a bargaining situation. (Graham & Herberger 1983, p. 160)

We have seen the differences between distributive and integrative bargaining earlier in the chapter. Miles (2013) suggests that questioning approaches need to be matched to the style of bargaining we are involved in (table 13.5). Here, Miles uses the concept of Pareto optimality (named after an economist), which simply means that no additional possible trade exists that would advantage one party without disadvantaging the other party to an equal degree.

**TABLE 13.5** The role of questioning in distributive versus integrative negotiation

	Distributive negotiation	Integrative negotiation
<b>Purpose of questioning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Learn information in order to assist substantiation</li> <li>Question (challenge) counterpart's substantiation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand interests and priorities of counterpart</li> <li>Discover potential trade-offs</li> </ul>
<b>Purpose of providing information</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Substantiate position</li> <li>Challenge counterpart's position State or imply strength of position (e.g. desirable BATNA)</li> <li>Justify requested concessions</li> <li>Anchor ambitiously</li> <li>Gain advantageous proportion of the resources available</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discover potential trade-offs</li> <li>Make interests and priorities known so they are more likely to be considered in the agreement</li> <li>Gain information</li> <li>Test understanding</li> <li>Meet interests of both parties</li> <li>Attempt to move closer to Pareto optimal frontier</li> </ul>
<b>Key risk in answering questions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sharing information that undermines negotiator's position or substantiation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Missing opportunities to discover beneficial trade-offs</li> </ul>

Source: Adapted from Miles (2013, p. 387).

## Persuasive skills

Part of the essence of the negotiating process is persuasion, and detecting persuasive tactics when used by other actors in the process. The art and science of persuasion will therefore figure strongly in the way we negotiate (see chapter 12 ‘Argument: logic, persuasion and influence’).

## Signalling skills

In the negotiation process, we need to pay attention to signals. Signals are verbal and nonverbal messages that tend to contradict or differ slightly from what is said. Why don’t people just come right out and say what they mean? Sometimes they do, but sometimes they prefer not to: they are trying to probe without committing themselves, to find out just how far you will go. Some of these signals are illustrated in table 13.6.

**TABLE 13.6** Signals in negotiation

Signal type	‘Example’	Meaning	‘Possible response’
<b>Qualifier</b>	‘As it stands, the offer is just ridiculous.’	Why don’t you change it slightly, and we’ll fall for it.	‘If you give us an idea of what you’re looking for, we’ll give it serious consideration.’
	‘We don’t <i>normally</i> give discounts . . .’	But we might this time if the price is right, or if you can do something for us . . .	‘I would be able to take 5 per cent more than my normal purchase, and I might be able to do better next month.’
	‘There’s <i>no way</i> we could look at 8 per cent at this time.’	Lower it and we will, or break it up into phased increments, or link it to productivity gains, or come back next month . . .	‘Why don’t we settle on 6 per cent now [code for ‘but you can beat me down to 5’], with 3 per cent next year?’
	‘I’m not going to sign an agreement <i>in that form</i> .’	Show me a more interesting agreement.	‘Let’s discuss which paragraphs you take exception to, and I’ll take it up with my boss.’
<b>Mixed absolute/qualifier</b>	‘We don’t give discounts, and <i>even if we did</i> they wouldn’t be as large as 14 per cent.’	I’ll give you 4 per cent.	‘If you did discounts, would you give 5 per cent?’
<b>Grandstanding</b>	‘It’s <i>board policy</i> that wage increases should not be higher than the national average.’	This is a like-to-have, not a must-have objective.	‘I’m sure the board will be pleased to see dividends rise, as they will when productivity goes up after staff get this modest rise.’
	‘ <i>Our people</i> would like to see wage justice.’	Double dilution: they ‘would like to’ rather than ‘demand’.	‘Times are tough. Off the record, what are you looking for?’

(continued)



TABLE 13.6 (continued)

Signal type	Example'	Meaning	'Possible response'
<b>Concealed appeal</b>	'If only you'd listened to us last year!'	We'd like some sort of ritual apology and chest beating, and then we can get on with it. Post-mortems won't get either side anywhere, but if you want one, just try disagreeing!	'Yes, we made an error of judgement. It's a mess. We can still prevent disaster, though. Look at these figures and tell us what you think.'
<b>Hypothetical</b>	'Let's assume for the sake of argument that it is possible to do it before that date. What terms would you be able to offer a vendor?'	We're interested, but we don't want to be seen committing ourselves yet.	'Just for the sake of argument, we'd be looking at \$100 000 down and the rest in 90 days.'
<b>False refusal</b>	'We won't be letting this contract until tomorrow. <i>However</i> , you've put so much trouble into preparing your bid, we thought it only fair to let you know that your offer wasn't competitive.'  'I won't negotiate under duress.'	There's still a chance — try harder. We won't risk appearing to be giving you an unfair advantage over the competition, so you take the initiative.  If you remove the threats, I'm willing to deal. Leave them in, and you've got a fight on your hands.	'Thanks for telling me. I'll see if I can't twist a few arms around here to come up with something better for a last-minute bid.'  'If we lift our sanctions for 48 hours, are you willing to at least discuss preliminaries?'
<b>Emphasis prompt</b>	'Our major concern is that our people won't be able to run such sophisticated equipment.'	Price is not a problem for us — don't waste our time talking about it. Reassure us about training.	'This equipment will give you market leadership. We will supply training for free if you take four units.'
<b>Cornering</b>	'We present this offer to you, which we consider to be <i>most fair and reasonable</i> .'	If you reject this, you will show yourself to be unfair and unreasonable.	'Well, much of life is unfair, isn't it? Let's look at it on its merits.'

Sources: Adapted from Kennedy, Benson, and Macmillan (1984); Margerison (2000); Thorn (2001); Ma, Showail, Campagna and Parks (2006), Folger, Poole and Stutman (2012); Shapiro (2015).

A *Qualifiers* signal, then, may be attached to what sounds like an absolute negative statement, which makes TOS look strong and resolute: 'As it stands, the offer is just ridiculous', the last word spat out, perhaps accompanied by a dismissive gesture. But the real, hidden message rests in the qualifying 'As it stands' – which, decoded, suggests that TOS are not as hostile as they choose to sound.

The *Mixed absolute/qualifier* is attached to a statement that sounds even more negative, but again the qualification suggests a different signal is actually being sent. *Grandstanding* signals are for public consumption. Again, the real message may not be quite so hostile.

*Concealed appeal* seems to invite post-mortems of past sins, but in fact it may be a signal to get on with things – if OS is willing to grovel a little to satisfy TOS’s honour (we may choose not to grovel, but it can be quicker and cheaper than fighting).

*Hypothetical* is a signal that TOS is willing to move on the problem but can’t commit itself yet until it knows approximately how OS will respond. *False refusal* appears to present a definite rebuff, but really it is only a definite maybe, which could become a definite yes under different circumstances (and it lies within the power of OS to change the circumstances). *Emphasis prompt* is a cue to what TOS really wants to talk about; it is a fairly obvious agenda-setting signal that is nonetheless often missed. *Cornering* is a ‘loaded language’ signal – TOS deliberately uses certain ‘hurray’ and ‘boo’ words, and dares us to challenge them (or they hope we don’t notice).

For signals or gestures to be noticed and to work, Mitchell (1991, p. 423) suggests that they must meet the following criteria.

- Benefit. It must confer some substantial and unambiguous benefit on the target and not the initiator (or at least the balance of benefits must clearly favour the target).
- Novelty. It must clearly be precedent-breaking.
- Irrevocability. Once made, it must be difficult to annul, rescind or amend; return to the status quo should not be an option.
- Noncontingency. Its implementation must not depend upon some action or fulfilment of some prior conditions by the target.
- Voluntariness. It must clearly be made unilaterally and not seen as made because of prior pressure, coercion, or extortion.
- Cost. It must impose a price on the initiator.
- Activity. It must involve some positive action by the initiator, rather than being an abstention from harmful action.
- Risk. It must increase the initiator’s vulnerability in some fashion, without having a similar effect on the target.

Signalling, of course, can be misunderstood, and we need to take care – especially with our body language or nonverbal communication – that our friendly gestures do not backfire (Menon, Sheldon and Galinsky, 2014).

## Cultural and gender sensitivity

Effective negotiators are sensitive to cultural differences. Such sensitivity is important when negotiating formally with people from other countries but is also becoming important in day-to-day transactions with ‘non-negotiators’ in our increasingly multicultural workplaces and global enterprises (Brett & Gelfand 2005; Salacuse 1998; Graham & Hernandez 2008).

Gender may also be significant as a factor in certain negotiations. Men and women may have real or perceived differences (and similarities) when it comes to attitudes and values and verbal and nonverbal communication, and we ignore these at our peril (Florea et al. 2003; Karakowsky & Miller 2006; Babcock & Laschever 2009; Eriksson and Sandberg, 2012; Hong and van der Wijst, 2013). From another point of view, we can see gender and cultural factors as aspects of negotiation styles (see online chapter 7 ‘Gender and communication’).

## Communication channels

The good negotiator is aware of the advantages and disadvantages of negotiating via different channels of communication – whether face to face (in formal or informal meetings, behind-the-scenes encounters (Wanis-St John 2006) or interactions through third parties) or mediated (via telephone, teleconference, fax, letter and email) (Krishnan, Kurtzberg and Naquin 2014).


## Negotiation styles

The process of negotiation can also be understood in terms of the personal styles used by those negotiating. In negotiation and conflict resolution, gender and cultural factors can be understood as styles (see previous section). The Jungian model (Jung 1923 [1976]) of 16 different psychological types, popularised through the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory, can be a useful guide to the dynamics of negotiation and conflict resolution (Reynolds 2006; Myers 1999; Eunson 2002 [1997]), pp. 147–50). The Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode model allows us to analyse and plan negotiations and conflicts by considering five styles of conflict handling (competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating). Hiam (1997) uses a model of negotiation process based on eight styles (compete, con, borrow, collaborate, compromise, rob, accommodate, withdraw).

### Warner's style model

Warner (2000) has developed a model of negotiation styles that is based on differing values of empathy and energy (figure 13.10). Empathy is the ability to emotionally connect with others, and energy relates to verbal energy (does the negotiator use a louder voice, speak faster and more enthusiastically?) and nonverbal energy (does the negotiator give very direct eye contact, lean forward, position the hands high in aggressive gestures, such as pointing?). This gives rise to four styles: Pushy bullying, Confident promoting, Quietly manipulating and Carefully suggesting. Typical phrases used by negotiators using such styles include the following.

- Could you please just let me finish? (Pushy bullying)
- I can appreciate your position on this. (Confident promoting)
- What motivates you to say this? (Quietly manipulating)
- Let me summarise what I am suggesting. (Carefully suggesting)



**FIGURE 13.10** Warner's styles of negotiation

Source: Warner (2000, p. 35).

Each negotiator may favour a particular style, but it may be possible for an individual negotiator to use two, three or all four styles in any given negotiation. While each style has strengths as well as weaknesses, coercion is not, in the final analysis, so productive, if only because it represents an aggressive win-lose orientation and thus may draw forth opposition and undermining of any agreements reached under such duress. Warner suggests that the most effective style is a super-style that involves elements of all four styles, with an emphasis on persuasiveness: this most effective super-style can be seen in the right-facing diamond shape overlaid on figure 13.10.

### Aronoff and Wilson's style model

Aronoff and Wilson (1985) developed a theory of styles of negotiation based on 11 personality variables.

- Abasement – self-blaming, surrendering, apologising, confessing, atoning, complying, accepting punishment; establishing control and prediction of others' actions by self-deprecating manoeuvres
- Dependency – seeking aid, protection, sympathy or help; fearing the loss of a powerful protector
- Approval – admiring, emulating, cooperating with, yielding eagerly to, and willingly serve a leader
- Authoritarianism – holding to conventional values, being hostile towards others, stereotyping of others, holding antidemocratic attitudes, being submissive and uncritical towards authority
- Order – careful structuring of events by directly imposing order on interpersonal relationships, the self or the world; organising tasks and social transactions in precise and detailed ways
- Affiliation – interacting with others, establishing intimate equal involvements with others in mutually satisfying social transactions
- Machiavellianism – manipulating and opportunistically exploiting relationships (see online chapter 9 'Leadership and communication')
- Dominance – establishing self-worth through demonstrations of directing, influencing and persuading others
- Nurturance – establishing self-worth by responsibly caring for the successful development of persons, generations and institutions, as well as the quality and significance of achievements and products
- Recognition – establishing self-worth through personal displays that gain admiration, respect, praise and prestige from others; drawing attention to one's actions, through the seeking of honours, or by succeeding at extremely difficult feats
- Achievement – establishing self-worth through successful competition with standards of excellence in the pursuit of task-oriented activity; being competitive in meeting standards of excellence across a wide range of transactions with the world (adapted from Aronoff & Wilson 1985, pp. 38–64).

This model, based in part on the personality theories of Murray (1938), allows Aronoff and Wilson to analyse the approaches different individuals will have to negotiation situations. For example, different individuals will have different approaches to bargaining, not only in relation to those who are on the other side of a negotiation, but also to those on their own side who are part of a negotiating team: will they be capable of yielding to pressure from others, or will they be firm and not ready to move? Similarly, different individuals will have different approaches to information use, which means approaches to problem solving, framing arguments and responding to new data and events in the negotiating process: will they be rigid or flexible in such situations? These two variables – bargaining stance and techniques of information use – can be combined to map the 11 different personality variables (figure 13.11).

		Bargaining stance	
		Firm	Yielding
Techniques of information use	Rigid	Abasement Order Dominance	Dependency Approval Authoritarianism Recognition
	Flexible	Machiavellianism Achievement Nurturance	Affiliation

**FIGURE 13.11** Bargaining versus information-using approaches in negotiation  
Source: Adapted from Aronoff and Wilson (1985, pp. 81–2, 108, 269–91).

Also, it is possible to analyse the personality variables in terms of negotiating styles based on whether individual negotiators choose to maximise their own or joint outcomes – to stress competition or cooperation; and also on the degree to which individual negotiators are frank or guarded in sharing their purposes with others – whether they are more prone to reveal or conceal facts and emotions. The combinations of these factors help produce a map of four different negotiating styles – integrative, adversarial, ingratiating and exploitative (figure 13.12).

		Cooperative	Competitive
		Revealing	Affiliation Achievement Nurturance  Style: <b>Integrative</b>
Concealing	Dependency Approval Order  Style: <b>Ingratiating</b>	Abasement Authoritarianism Machiavellianism  Style: <b>Exploitative</b>	

**FIGURE 13.12** Aronoff and Wilson’s negotiation styles model  
Source: Adapted from Aronoff and Wilson (1985, pp. 81–2, 108, 269–91).

The model may help us when in the middle of practical negotiations. For example, if we are not ready to move towards some type of compromise with the other side, or try to develop mutually satisfactory outcomes on common ground, or if we find that we are not responding as effectively as we might to new circumstances and information, perhaps the problem lies within ourselves rather than with objective conditions. We may need to consider to what extent our own personalities are working against our own best interests.

The model also gives other insights into the ‘dark side’ of human motivations:

- the authoritarian personality, while notoriously rigid in problem solving and coping with new circumstances, can be surprisingly yielding in negotiations, especially when confronted with opposing negotiators who seem to have higher status or rank

- the abasement personality may be self-sabotaging as a negotiator, working in a variety of conscious and unconscious ways to evoke dissatisfaction and irritation from others – in effect, by being as exploitative as the Machiavellians and authoritarians
- the nurturance personality, while being ready to consider new information, may not be open enough to move within the dynamics of the negotiation process – for example, from a distributive to an integrative mode of thinking; this means that they are just like achievement personalities, but also just like the more unpleasant Machiavellians.

## Strategies and tactics

What about strategies and tactics? How can we use them ourselves, how can we identify when TOS uses them, and what counters might there be? For many people, this is the heart of negotiation, while for others (such as Calero and Oskam), the topic is somewhat overrated and perhaps misses the point:

There's no question that strategy and tactics are basic elements in any negotiation, but we think they're often over-emphasized. Somehow the impression develops that negotiation is nothing more than working a variety of ploys to manoeuvre an opposite into a desired commitment. More fundamental considerations are slighted in favour of a kind of 'game' theory that concentrates attention on techniques for 'playing' the opposition rather than on understanding the nature and psychology of the negotiation process itself. Unless you understand the art of persuasion, the importance of listening, the essentials of building trust and maintaining good will, you can't negotiate effectively, no matter what your line of strategy or arsenal of tactics includes. (Calero & Oskam 1988, p. 127)

Accepting this qualification, we should nonetheless be aware of strategies and tactics, if only for the sake of self-defence. What is the difference between a strategy and a tactic? The terms tend to be used interchangeably, but it is useful to see a strategy as a particular combination of tactics. There are many strategies and tactics in negotiation. Table 13.7 offers a small sample of them.

**TABLE 13.7** Some tactics used in negotiation

Tactic	Brief description
<b>1. It's official</b>	TOS says 'Sorry, but I can't change company policy or contracts', or may point to the price tag. Often accompanied with 'I'd like to help, but...' But all contracts are written to benefit the seller, and price tags are routinely marked down during sales. Do your research: find out what rival other sides are offering, and ask TOS to match or better that. If you can afford it, try to buy several of the desired objects, and ask for a discount, threatening to walk out if you can't get it. This depends on what is more important to TOS: commission or units moved. If you feel it's worthwhile, try the counter tactic of smearing: threaten to contact the media, trade associations, consumer organisations, your local Consumer Affairs department and everyone at your workplace.
<b>2. Grab the power seat</b>	Symbolism is often silly, but many believe that if a negotiation or discussion is to take place at a rectangular table, then the person who sits at the narrow end (farthest from the door, in front of a window), has most power in a meeting or negotiation. The seat at the other end is often also perceived to have power, although not quite so much. Arrive early and grab what you want.
<b>3. Record and facilitate</b>	Negotiations can often be influenced by the way the agenda is set out (e.g. 'What comes first? Last? What is not there? What can be read between the lines? What is the hidden agenda?'). The same can be said for the minutes: no-one wants to write them; but volunteer, perhaps changing a few things to benefit OS. This requires some skill, if the wording or outcome is not to be challenged. Similar to writing the agenda and/or minutes and grabbing the power seat is volunteering to record ideas, and brainstorming on flipcharts or whiteboards. Rather than being a passive functionary, however, gradually assume the role of a facilitator — suggesting, questioning, and becoming, in fact, the de facto chair.

*(continued)*

**TABLE 13.7** (continued)

Tactic	Brief description
<p><b>4. You owe me one</b></p>	<p>In negotiations over price, time, quality, salary, promotion — or, in fact, anything — TOS expects a battle from us. But what if we exercise strategic restraint? For example, your sales are up, but you know budgets are tight. Instead of asking for a raise, try something like saying (while smiling): ‘I know things are bad on the cash flow front, so even though I would like to see some recognition of my sales, I’ll bite my tongue and that might free up some resources for you. Maybe we can talk about it during our next three-monthly session, and maybe things won’t be so tight then.’ Try to have a witness present and or/send a confirming email, creating a document trail. It doesn’t always work, especially with nasty bosses, but it often does: you’ve helped them out with money and time, and now they’re obligated. You’re smiling now, but he/she knows that if things don’t improve (especially if your sales keep going up), then the organisational grapevine will go wild, characterising him/her as an exploiter and a bad people and resources manager, and overall sales performance will probably go down, as other salespeople will realise that virtue will not be rewarded. This is a lose–lose situation for TOS. This is cashable restraint, and obligation, reputation, trust and fairness are very powerful tools in negotiation in both eastern and western societies. Untrustworthy negotiators may win the battle, but lose the war.</p>
<p><b>5. Getting the opposition to set limits</b></p>	<p>Negotiations in adversarial situations are usually about both sides opening up with extreme opening bids. The haggling and us-versus-them approach can sometimes be negated by this tactic. Give TOS an extreme case — more extreme than their opening bid (industrial sabotage as grounds for dismissal, eight pizzas for four moderate eaters, wedding guests numbers, ultra-high salaries after audited copies of a weak budget are distributed [‘open-book management’] — and ask them if they think that is reasonable. Nonverbals are crucial here: don’t be smug; be sincere, and show that you want a win–win situation. TOS will almost certainly (grudgingly) concede that the ridiculous is just that, and so you can begin to work backwards to something that will satisfy both parties. Know every detail of your case. What you are doing with this tactic is converting differences of kind into differences of degree. Both sides can thus move backwards, incrementally or bit-by-bit, from an extreme position to a more reasonable one. TOS will have participated in setting limits, and so may be more committed to the final deal.</p>
<p><b>6. Save face</b></p>	<p>If TOS’s dignity is assaulted — for example, in a humiliating defeat — they won’t forget it: your cheap victory may prove to be very expensive. Remember TOS’s position vis-à-vis their principals or constituency. To be ethical, you should respect their dignity and competence. To be brutally cynical, it is wiser to give some crumbs to pushovers — and let them take the credit for it — than to have pushovers pushed over and replaced by much tougher operators. Classic Chinese military and strategic texts counsel restraint when thinking about annihilating TOS (‘Build them a golden bridge for retreat’ — Sun Tzu). You should do likewise.</p> <p>Remember, saving face is a phenomenon unique to all peoples on the planet, but it has specific resonances in certain cultures that you should be aware of if you are negotiating with representatives from those cultures. This is similar to getting the opposition to set limits: you come across as the good guys, and it creates obligation — a form of you owe me one. There is no guarantee that you will always be the winner, and TOS may feel obligated to return the favour.</p>
<p><b>7. Nibble</b></p>	<p>Nibbling is a tactic in which a negotiator will ask for a last-minute, relatively small (but still expensive) concession. Nibbling depends on the amount of time and effort that has been invested in the negotiation, and the hope that TOS will reluctantly go along with it (but still be irritated at your nerve). A classic nibble would be spending a lot of time on buying an expensive suit, and as the sales clerk writes up the sales docket (dreaming of the commission from the sale), you ask her/him to throw in a free tie or belt. Counter tactics to nibbles include playing it’s official, anticipating a nibble by including it in your original time, and simply refusing it (otherwise, you may get known as a soft touch for this sneaky tactic from the nibbler).</p>
<p><b>8. Fait accompli</b></p>	<p>Fait accompli means ‘accomplished fact’ in French. It means that one side has no intention of negotiating or of giving to get, and probably believes that forgiveness is easier to get than permission. It has a ‘take it or leave it’ dynamic. It’s substantially, but not totally, a matter of the respective power bases of the two sides. The more powerful are more inclined to try this on. Like the nibble, fait accompli may involve suddenly announcing additional costs, deliveries, services or repairs, or an unequal prenuptial agreement — the applicability of the tactic is endless. Of course, it destroys trust. Responses include accepting it meekly (which may be a strategic retreat, but may also lead TOS to think that you are weak, and they can try this on again); and going along but asking for a cooling-off period (if this is not legislated) and then renegotiating — that is, challenging the rationale of the demands, one by one.</p>

Tactic	Brief description
<p><b>9. Volume control</b></p>	<p>You can capitulate, but suddenly find reasons for going very slow and/or badly on carrying out your side of the deal (playing dumb all the while, of course). You can also threaten to go elsewhere, threaten to smear (as with it's official), threaten to destroy TOS's reputation — so that they win the battle but not the war (no-one else will want to work with treacherous bullies) — or walk away.</p> <p>This tactic demonstrates the necessity of clarifying guidelines for a negotiation before it has begun.</p> <p>This can be played loud or soft. The loud version involves one side staging tantrums, yelling and engaging in histrionics to disorient you (in the same way that police and anti-terror units yell to disorient suspects). This is all designed to frighten, bully and confuse. If it can be engineered, now's the time to take a break. You can counter with volume, but beware of being dragged into the conflict spiral. Remain cool and consider this example: In 1960, when giving a speech at the United Nations, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who was renowned for his 'unflappability', or cool, was interrupted by the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was pounding his desk with his shoe and yelling in Russian. Unfazed, Macmillan continued, asking for a translation; and in doing so, transforming Khrushchev from frightening to ridiculous. Threaten to smear — after all, who wants to haggle with a sociopath?</p> <p>The soft version is when TOS simply goes silent. This is normal among people from some cultures, but it is sometimes used to disconcert other people, who may then, perhaps, fall into the 'pause pit' and say and sign things that they may later regret. Counters include saying 'Please continue thinking it over', and starting to work on your own (e.g. on a computer); taking a break; or talking nonstop (filibuster) about procedural matters until TOS becomes frustrated and re-joins the game.</p>
<p><b>10. Verify, verify, verify</b></p>	<p>Budget time in your negotiations to verify; that is, to clarify just what has been agreed to. Better yet, get it in writing: for example, a memorandum of understanding or contract written by lawyers on both sides or by a professional mediator, or a roster on housework taped onto the fridge or on a separate noticeboard. Memory is treacherous, and it is not to be relied upon. If you can confirm a negotiation with a handshake, and make it stick, consider yourself to be very lucky. Social norms — underpinned by a fear of being smeared — strengthen such agreements.</p>

Source: Adopted from Mills (2005), Gosselin (2007), Lewicki and Hiam (1998), Eunson (2002 [1994]), Lewicki, Barry and Saunders (2015).

## Planning

We have now progressed a long way through our original model of the negotiation process. All the knowledge and skills in the world will do us no good, however, unless we have some kind of plan. *Fail to plan, plan to fail*. It doesn't matter whether we are to negotiate the borders between two countries, the price of a car or the end of a lovers' spat: we need to think about it beforehand. We should resist the temptation to jump straight into things simply because we have a bias towards action over thought, or because we imagine that time pressure leaves us no opportunity for planning.

If you feel that you have a reasonable grasp of the factors involved in the negotiating situation you have ahead of you, now is the time to work with the negotiation planning grid (see figure 13.13). Work with this copy of the grid or make as large a copy of it as you can. Notice that it addresses both sides in the negotiation — OS and TOS. For the most part we will be guessing about the relevant factors for TOS, but chance favours the prepared mind. The same applies to our own side. Don't think you can do without planning: one side is enough to guess about. (Note also that not all factors or panels in the grid may be relevant to any given negotiation situation.)

## Role-play: be smart, not shy or cynical

Once you have made some notes on a copy of the grid, you might consider some role-plays, either with someone else taking the part of TOS or with you taking this role. Many people feel uncomfortable with role-playing, but it makes sense to overcome any inhibitions and at least try the experience. You may find that the pressures involved allow you to think of



new approaches. You may also find that playing the role of TOS gives you insights into their motivation and approaches, and as a result you may begin to see a way to develop what is perhaps the most important panel in the whole grid, the one labelled 'Mutual interests'. Note that this panel is not divided into two sides.

Factor	Our side	The other side
BATNA		
WATNA		
Goals (rated from top to bottom priority)		
Positions		
Mutual interests		
Bottom lines		
Concessions		
Territory		
Time constraints/opportunities		
Publics/stakeholders		
Packaging		
Strategies and tactics		
Team roles		
Stress factors		
Gender aspects		
Signals		
Listening/questioning/persuading factors		
Cultural aspects		
Communication channels		
Negotiation styles		

**FIGURE 13.13** A negotiation planning grid

## Agreement

As we have noted, negotiation varies widely in scale and significance. It may comprise no more than a silent exchange of gestures between two individuals in a room, or it may involve an elaborate series of meetings between large teams of individuals over years.

Some problems have no solution, and agreement is not always possible. When this is recognised, people may opt to exercise their BATNAs, to submit to humiliating defeat and sign the paper, or merely to give a tearful nod. Alternately, both sides may celebrate a mutually satisfactory outcome, in which a win-win resolution is achieved: both sides win, there are no losers, and the agreement marks the beginning of a long, highly productive partnership. Still another alternative is for both sides to wearily return to the beginning of the negotiating process and start again.

Always be ready to walk away, either as a temporary tactic or to disengage permanently from the process. Remember, if you are so locked into the process that you can't walk away, or believe you can't walk away, then this constitutes crucial leverage that TOS has over you. Be ready to bluff on this, or at least do everything you can to avoid sending out nonverbal signals to the other side that you are locked in.

## Confirming it

Confirmation of agreement can be validated by a simple handshake or nod of the head, or by signing a thousand-page contract. The form will vary considerably from situation to situation, and indeed from culture to culture. Wherever possible (and you should try to make it possible as often as you can), write it down and get all parties to endorse it. At the very least this will minimise post-negotiation controversies of the 'But I thought we agreed to . . .' variety.

## Negotiation: not a line but a circle

Now that confirmation has been made, the negotiation is over. Or is it? It may, in fact, simply be a beginning, rather than an end. You may have negotiated a temporary equilibrium that will soon become unstable again; it may have been a battle within a larger war. TOS may perceive the negotiations as ongoing, as never really ending. Depending on the culture, the negotiation process may be a ritualised aspect of an ongoing relationship that needs to be constantly maintained and nurtured. Whatever the situation, you will probably find yourself – whether in two or three hours, or two or three years – returning to the beginning of negotiation model. In other words, the model is circular, not linear).

# STUDENT STUDY GUIDE

## SUMMARY

Negotiation is a communication and problem-solving process built on a wide foundation of skills and bodies of knowledge. It is also one of the most popular and effective methods of solving conflicts. It may not be appropriate in every situation, however. In deciding whether we want to negotiate, we need to consider BATNAs (best alternatives to a negotiated agreement), WATNAs (worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement), the virtues of avoidance and the necessity for Plan Bs.

Conflict is often perceived in terms of the dynamics of winning and losing, but a win-win outcome is a practical necessity if a negotiated agreement is to have lasting value. In preparing for a negotiation, we must first research the other side, then identify clearly our goals, our bottom lines and the concessions we are willing to make. Effective negotiators are aware of the dynamics of the exchange of concessions in negotiations. They understand the difference between positions and interests, the role of territory and time, and of publics or stakeholders in negotiation. They are also aware of how packaging techniques can offer greater flexibility when discussing outcomes.

Sometimes culture and gender are relevant, even vital factors in managing negotiations. In team negotiations individuals can play different roles. We need to grasp the value of nonverbal communication, and listening, questioning and persuading skills, and to understand the functions and expressions of signals.

As negotiators, we should be aware of the effectiveness and limitations of strategies and tactics, and how different channels of communication can help or hinder negotiation processes. Finally, we must ensure that we plan the negotiation process in order to maximise our options, minimise our stress and provide a solid foundation for a lasting, fair and creative agreement between negotiating parties.

## KEY TERMS

BATNA <i>p. 460</i>	MLATNA <i>p. 461</i>	WATNA <i>p. 460</i>
bottom line <i>p. 463</i>	negative-sum outcome <i>p. 457</i>	win-win situation <i>p. 457</i>
concession <i>p. 463</i>	PATNA <i>p. 461</i>	winner's curse <i>p. 468</i>
distributive bargaining <i>p. 465</i>	Plan B <i>p. 460</i>	zero-sum outcome <i>p. 457</i>
integrative bargaining <i>p. 465</i>	positive-sum outcome <i>p. 457</i>	

## REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Why is the term 'win-win' more than simply a cliché in most negotiations?
2. Why should we bother to save the face of our opponents in situations when we can clearly dominate them and impose a win-lose outcome on them?
3. What is the difference between a WATNA and a BATNA?
4. When trading concessions, what is the ideal strategy to follow?
5. What is the main difference between a position and an interest?
6. List three points in favour of and three points against negotiating on your home ground.
7. What is the winner's curse, and how can it be avoided or minimised?
8. Identify at least three different types of signals.
9. Identify at least four different negotiation tactics.
10. Why is it important always to have the option of walking away from a negotiation rather than automatically settling?

11. What does the phrase 'negotiation – not a line but a circle' mean?
12. Compare two different models of negotiation.
13. Compare two negotiation styles.

#### APPLIED ACTIVITIES

1. Use the planning grid to plan an actual negotiation. Role-play it, using video if possible.
2. Using print and online sources, create a master list of negotiation strategies and tactics. Write brief notes on each, identifying strengths and weaknesses. Speculate on what strategies and tactics could be usefully combined, and what strategies and tactics would not work well together. If you wish to go further, answer the question: What is the difference between a negotiation strategy and a negotiation tactic?
3. Pick a situation, even one that does not apparently involve conflict, such as: Where will families meet to celebrate a ritual or festival like Christmas? Where should a meeting between separate departments take place? Where should students meet to study together? Where should band members meet to practise? Where should one meet with a client or customer? Analyse the situation in terms of territorial dynamics. Does it matter where the encounter takes place? Why? Why not?
4. Write a dialogue in which two or more negotiators use different signals to send different messages. As a variation, write it twice – once in which both sides successfully decode the signals, and once in which one or both sides fails to decode the signals.
5. Consider a personal or professional situation that ended badly, with hurt feelings on both sides. Analyse the situation in terms of what concessions or tradeables could have been exchanged to achieve a more positive outcome.
6. Interview someone who works in a field involving money (e.g. an accountant, a lawyer, a human resources/personnel specialist or a banking specialist). Brief them on the idea of packaging in negotiation, and then ask them what packaging options they are aware of in their field.
7. Review the material on communication channels (see chapter 1). How might the outcome of a negotiation be affected by the use of one or several channels? What is the relationship of channels to territory in negotiations?
8. When resources are created, the pie becomes bigger, and parties to a negotiation are likely to be more satisfied. How can resources be created?

#### WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

You are the leader of the Red Party in federal Parliament. You would like to have a clear majority over your major opponents, the Blue Party, but can't, having instead to depend on the votes of seven members of the Orange Party. The support of the Orange Party is not always guaranteed, and they have proven to be tough negotiators to get some of their policies up in the past.

Two big issues are coming up in parliament: euthanasia and nuclear power. In terms of legalising euthanasia, it has been proposed that there be a free or conscience vote on the issue. However, your Red Party's secret survey data back from some recent state elections shows that a large conservative element is against the concept. It would therefore be politically risky to be seen to be supporting its introduction, though both the Blue and Orange Parties have indicated they are in favour of legalising euthanasia in appropriate circumstances. Regarding the second issue, most of the members of Parliament were treated to a demonstration of a new fusion plant recently, which puts out very little radioactivity and provides significantly cheaper electricity than that provided by alternative sources, not

to mention putting out low carbon emissions (the Blue Party has been pro-nuclear for some time). The demonstration has changed the minds of many members of the Red Party, who have been stridently anti-nuclear for some time (as have the Orange Party). Further, you know for a fact that at least two members of the Orange Party – albeit reluctantly – support such a power system.

You invite these two Orange Party members, and an additional two of their parliamentary colleagues, along to a meeting. You ask them all to support the construction of a test reactor, offering a ministry position to any one of them as an inducement for this. You also show them your Party's survey data on euthanasia, which suggests that politicians seem to be supporting legislation to introduce it might lose many votes (and quite possibly their seats) at the upcoming election. You suggest to the four Orange Party members that they exercise their conscience vote against it, which is your Red Party's official stance on the issue.

You can see that they have strongly held mixed emotions on these issues, taking into account long-held policies, personal ambitions and beliefs. You also see the chance to split their party four to three on both issues, and in doing so, possibly destroy it.

What options are there for all players in this situation?

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


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## 1. Assess your BATNA using a four-step process.

Adapted from “Accept or Reject? Sometimes the Hardest Part of Negotiation Is Knowing When to Walk Away,” by Deepak Malhotra (professor, Harvard Business School), first published in the *Negotiation* newsletter, August 2004.

It was a classic case of a business partnership gone awry. After building a profitable construction company together over several decades, Larry Stevenson and Jim Shapiro recognized that their differences had become irreconcilable. Stevenson wanted to buy out Shapiro, who was willing to sell for the right price. After months of haggling and legal maneuvering, Stevenson made his final offer: \$8.5 million for Shapiro’s shares in the company.

The company is worth about \$20 million, Shapiro thought to himself. I own 49% of the shares. Heck, I helped build this company. I’m not going to accept anything less than my fair share—\$10 million. I’d rather fight in court than accept \$8.5 million. Shapiro rejected the offer, and each party prepared for a trial.

Shapiro’s rationale for rejecting Stevenson’s offer seemed reasonable enough. Furthermore, Shapiro’s lawyers assured him, a court ruling very likely would be in his favor.

Yet Shapiro made the wrong choice. He could have figured this out if he had assessed his BATNA—his *best alternative to a negotiated agreement*. A negotiator’s BATNA is the course of action he will pursue if the current negotiation results in an impasse. An evaluation of your best alternative to a deal is critical if you are to establish the threshold at which you will reject an offer.

Effective negotiators determine their BATNAs before talks begin. When you fail to do so, you’re liable to make a costly mistake—rejecting a deal you should

have accepted or accepting one you'd have been wise to reject. In negotiation, it's important to have high aspirations and to fight hard for a good outcome. But it's just as critical to establish a walkaway point that is firmly grounded in reality.

**Assessing your BATNA.** To determine your BATNA in a given negotiation, follow these four steps:

**List your alternatives.** Think about all the alternatives available to you if the current negotiation ends in an impasse. What are your no-deal options?

**Evaluate your alternatives.** Examine each option and calculate the value of pursuing each one.

**Establish your BATNA.** Choose a course of action that would have the highest expected value for you. This is your BATNA—the course you should pursue if the current negotiation fails.

**Calculate your reservation value.** Now that you know your BATNA, calculate your *reservation value*—the lowest-valued deal you are willing to accept. If the value of the deal proposed to you is lower than your reservation value, you'll be better off rejecting the offer and pursuing your BATNA. If the final offer is higher than your reservation value, you should accept it.

To assess his BATNA, Shapiro first should have obtained the following information from his lawyers: estimated litigation costs, \$500,000; his likelihood of winning in court, approximately 70%; and the fact that if he won, he would receive \$10 million for his shares, whereas if he lost, he likely would receive only \$3 million.

Next, Shapiro should have used this formula to determine the actual value of his BATNA:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 (0.7 \times \$10\text{MM}) \text{ Value if he wins in court} \\
 + (0.3 \times \$3\text{MM}) \text{ Value if he loses in court} \\
 - \$500,000 \text{ Cost of litigation} \\
 \hline
 \$7.4\text{MM}
 \end{array}$$

Shapiro should then have determined his reservation value for the negotiation with Stevenson: What is the least he would accept? It's worth noting that, after the trial was well under way, Shapiro came to believe that he should not

have rejected Stevenson's offer. "I still think the offer should have been higher," he said, "but if I could go back, I'd accept it. Righteous indignation is worth something, but it's not worth \$1.1 million."

## 2. Take your BATNA to the next level.

Adapted from "Taking BATNA to the Next Level" by Guhan Subramanian (professor, Harvard Business School and Harvard Law School), first published in the *Negotiation* newsletter, January 2007.

If your current negotiation reaches an impasse, what's your best outside option? Most seasoned negotiators understand the value of evaluating their BATNA, or *best alternative to a negotiated agreement*, a concept that Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton introduced in their seminal book, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (Penguin, 1991, second edition). Even those who don't know the term probably think through their BATNA instinctively as they prepare for a negotiation. An awareness of your BATNA—particularly if it's a strong one—can give you the confidence you need to walk away from a subpar agreement.

Although BATNA is a commonsense concept in the negotiation world, achieving "best practice" in this arena is not easy. Here are three strategies to help you take the BATNA concept to the next level and gain a critical advantage in upcoming deals.

**1. Translate your BATNA to the current deal.** Here's a classic illustration of the BATNA concept: while haggling over a rug in a bazaar, you're aware that you can purchase an identical rug at a nearby stall for \$100. Assuming that you want only one rug, you won't pay more than \$100 in the negotiation at hand. Such clear-cut BATNAs tend to exist more in theory than in reality. In truth, your best alternative to agreement is rarely, if ever, apples-to-apples comparable with the deal at hand.

The implication? When negotiating, take time out for an explicit translation process to ensure that you aren't giving up a good deal in hand for a BATNA in the bush. Recently, for example, as the renewal deadline for his homeowner's insurance policy approached, Larry decided to do a "market check" to compare

prices. His existing insurer—let’s call it Acme—had been raising its rates by 7% to 10% annually for the past three years, and Larry wasn’t sure he was getting the best deal. He then found a carrier that offered a policy for 30% less than Acme’s renewal rate.

Delighted, Larry came very close to switching to the new insurer. But after doing some digging (and receiving some self-interested guidance from Acme), Larry identified important coverages and term definitions buried deep in the legalese of the two policies. After going through a translation process to make the prices comparable, Larry realized that Acme, his current insurer, was offering him a better deal. The lesson: Rather than assuming that the deal on the table matches your BATNA point by point, translate your BATNA to fully understand what it means for the current negotiation.

**2. Assess their BATNA with care.** It may seem an obvious step, but even the most sophisticated negotiators often fail to think through the other party’s BATNA as carefully and objectively as they think through their own. Although you can’t assess someone else’s BATNA as precisely as you can your own, asking “What will he do without a deal?” provides valuable insight.

Consider the case of a Mississippi farmer in the early 1990s. The state legislature had just legalized riverboat gambling, and the farmer owned land along the Mississippi River that was very attractive for the development of hotels, restaurants, and other businesses. Sure enough, an entrepreneur approached the farmer about buying his land. Before meeting to negotiate a purchase price, the farmer hired a professor of agriculture to estimate the land’s value. After conducting soil tests and estimating cash flows, the professor concluded that the land was worth approximately \$3 million.

As the negotiation began, the farmer kept quiet and let the entrepreneur frame the discussion. His opening offer: \$7 million. Though ecstatic, the farmer kept his composure and made a counteroffer of \$9.5 million. Eventually they reached a deal of \$8.5 million.

You might view this tale as a success story for the farmer; after all, he got \$8.5 million when he was only expecting \$3 million. But what if the farmer had considered the entrepreneur’s perspective, perhaps retaining an expert in the gaming industry to assess the land? He might have learned just how profitable casinos

can be and that the benefit to the entrepreneur of securing the optimal location rather than a second-best BATNA was worth much more than \$8.5 million.

**3. Think through two-level BATNAs.** In most business negotiations, you face two counterparts: the individual across the table and the organization he represents. This means you're facing two BATNAs as well. Sophisticated deal makers think through *both* BATNAs—the organization's and the individual's.

In one real-world case, a vacation resort was seeking to have certain equipment installed on its property. The equipment manufacturer sent Frank, the CEO's newly hired lieutenant, to negotiate this major contract. The resulting deal was extremely successful for both sides.

A few years later, the manufacturer held its annual meeting of top managers at the resort to show off its installations and celebrate the deal. The two organizations held a panel discussion to reflect on the dynamics of their negotiation. At one point, the moderator asked Frank to reveal his BATNA. He responded with a textbook analysis: "Our BATNA was to look around for some other major contract in which to powerfully demonstrate our capability." When pressed, he continued, "Well, *my* BATNA, as a new hire, was probably to look around for another job if I didn't get the deal."

Most meaningful negotiations occur between organizations, not individuals—yet individuals, not organizations, negotiate deals. Thus, it's crucial to consider the incentives of the individual across the table: How is she compensated? How long has she worked for the company? What are her long-term aspirations? Only by examining both pieces of the BATNA will you gain a complete picture of the other side's walk-away alternatives.

### 3. Track BATNAs in multiparty negotiations.

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Adapted from "How to Cope When the Table Gets Crowded," first published in the *Negotiation* newsletter, August 2011.

**N**egotiations between just two sides can be tough enough to manage. Add more parties to the mix, and things get a lot more complicated. Yet multiparty talks are common: think of department heads dividing up scarce resources,

family members debating the future of a business, or a group of consumers launching a class-action lawsuit.

One of the issues that makes multiparty negotiations more complex than two-party talks, according to Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Lawrence Susskind and Harvard Law School professor Robert Mnookin, is the fluctuating nature of each party's *best alternative to a negotiated agreement* (BATNA). By preparing for this complication, you will be well positioned to thrive in your next round of multiparty negotiations.

As in a two-party negotiation, you should enter multiparty talks with a solid idea of your BATNA—that is, what you will do if a deal fails to materialize. Knowledge of your BATNA can help you stand firm in the face of offers that fall short of your goals.

Suppose that Mark, an unemployed marketing professional, is preparing to meet with his three siblings to discuss the future of their marginally profitable family business. Mark's preference is to dissolve the business and use his share of the assets to start a consulting firm. However, he knows that one or two of his siblings would prefer to keep the business running as is or sell it. If the negotiation doesn't work out as he would like, Mark decides that his BATNA is to move to a city across the country where a colleague has offered him a job.

You should also attempt to analyze the BATNAs of the other parties at the table. Roughly calculating the minimum you can offer someone to secure a commitment will help you immensely. Mark, for instance, expects that his sister Leah, who has been involved in the business, will demand a large share of the pie in exchange for agreeing to dissolve it. He estimates that she will ask for 50% of the assets but be willing to settle for about 40% and accept a position with a client.

In negotiations among a large number of parties, determining each party's BATNA can be a daunting, even impossible, undertaking. At the very least, try to foresee how parties may align and estimate the BATNA of each possible coalition.

Once discussions begin, parties' BATNAs will begin to fluctuate, according to Susskind and Mnookin. For instance, imagine that Mark persuades his sister Jaclyn and brother Tom that the business should be dissolved. At this point, because



Leah is outnumbered, her BATNA becomes a virtual nonissue. Yet to preserve their relationship with her and each other, her siblings become focused on dividing up the assets in a way that satisfies them all. A payoff matrix—a spreadsheet that lists the names of the parties in rows, the issues to be discussed in columns, and the parties’ priorities on those issues in the boxes that are formed—will help you keep track of shifting BATNAs in addition to parties’ preferences.

## 4. Anticipate hidden hazards of BATNA research.

Adapted from “Dear Negotiation Coach: Hidden Hazards of BATNA Development,” by Francesca Gino (professor, Harvard Business School), first published in the *Negotiation* newsletter, May 2012.

**Question:** I was recently put in charge of negotiations with a supplier involved in one of our company’s products. Given what I’ve learned in school and in negotiation books, I did my homework: I started exploring options with other suppliers to gain power and reduce risk in case the current negotiations with my preferred vendor go sour. I invested quite a bit of time (and money!) creating those options, but in the end I was not interested in pursuing them, and I let them go. Now I can’t help but wonder: Was it a mistake to do so much research?

**PROFESSOR FRANCESCA GINO:** Negotiators often spend time and energy pursuing alternatives to the current deal to gain more power at the bargaining table. In classic negotiation texts and research, you’ll find the same advice: bargainers would be wise to invest resources in strengthening their *best alternative to a negotiated agreement* (BATNA), or their fallback alternative, in the event that the parties fail to reach an agreement.

Investing in outside alternatives enhances power by giving you other opportunities if the current negotiation cannot or will not provide the outcome you desire. Thus, outside alternatives often entail sunk costs, or irrevocable investments that keep open the possibility of pursuing other specific courses of action in the future. In a situation such as yours, investments in outside alternatives may enhance your leverage in the negotiation.

So far, so good, right? Well, there’s more to the story. In addition to helping

you enhance your power, these investments in strengthening your BATNA can have other, potentially unintended consequences. Your realization that investments you made and discarded represent irrecoverable costs may affect your behavior in the current negotiation in ways you don't expect.

Specifically, research I conducted with my Harvard Business School colleague Deepak Malhotra shows that the extent to which decision makers invest directly in outside options influences how entitled they feel in the current negotiation. When you decided to forgo options that you invested time and money in creating, you may feel as though you wasted resources. This perceived loss creates a desire for a counterbalancing gain. Thus, it is likely to trigger a sense of entitlement: the feeling that you deserve a favorable outcome in the current negotiation. Our research shows that the costlier a negotiator's investment in developing a strong BATNA is, the stronger those feelings of entitlement will be.

We found that this sense of entitlement causes the negotiator to have high aspirations in the current relationship, and these aspirations fuel opportunistic behavior.

Your sunk costs—and not simply the leverage provided by the outside options you created—may lead you to exploit your counterpart in ways that could damage your relationship going forward. So, for instance, you may find yourself lying or misrepresenting information to your counterpart in an attempt to improve your outcomes. You may feel entitled to use aggressive strategies to reach a better deal for yourself. Without your realizing it, the foregone alternatives are influencing your behavior.

Since you likely are interested in maintaining a good relationship with the supplier in your current negotiation, you should consider the effect that the foregone options in which you invested might have on your expectations and behaviors as you negotiate. Namely, your prior investments may compromise your ethical standards. By remaining vigilant about negotiating in good faith and reciprocating goodwill, you should be able to emerge from the shadow cast by sunk costs. ♥



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## Dr. Haruka SAKAMOTO

Title	Dr.
Affiliation	Tokyo Women's Medical University
Profile	<p>Haruka SAKAMOTO, MD MPH, PhD, is a primary care physician and associate professor at the Section of Global Health, Department of Hygiene and Public Health, Tokyo Women's Medical University. She got her M.D from Sapporo Medical University and worked as a physician at St Luke's International Hospital in Tokyo for several years. She then got a scholarship from the World Bank and got her MPH at the Harvard T.H Chan School of Public Health. From 2011-2013 and 2016, she worked at the international cooperation department, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, where she was deeply involved in health policy activities in Japan. As part of the work, she participated in WHO meetings, G7 meetings, and bilateral cooperation activities through JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency). She got PhD from University of Tokyo in 2021, and she's also currently working at World Health Organization Western Pacific Regional Office as a consultant, senior manager at Health and Global Policy Institute, senior fellow at Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, and Associate Member of the Science Council of Japan (26th). Her current research focuses on health system strengthening, health care financing, and politics in global health.</p>
Lecture summary	<p>Many people are unfamiliar with an intervention at international conferences and have no idea what is the "format" of an intervention. In this lecture, I will show you what to include in your intervention, starting with the format of interventions you should make at international conferences (mainly at the WHO meetings). On the other hand, I will tell you about some bad things you better not to say (don't).</p>
Reading list	<p><a href="https://www.indeed.com/career-advice/career-development/negotiation-skills">https://www.indeed.com/career-advice/career-development/negotiation-skills</a> (a site rich in information and tips, owned by Recruit Holdings Co.LTD) <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341640882_Negotiation_skills">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341640882_Negotiation_skills</a> ( A good analytic overview on negotiation) <a href="https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/international-negotiation-daily/intercultural-negotiation-does-the-batna-concept-translate/">https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/international-negotiation-daily/intercultural-negotiation-does-the-batna-concept-translate/</a> (An article on BATNA in intercultural settings)</p>



## Dr. Shinjiro NOZAKI

Title	Compliance and Risk Management officer
Affiliation	WHO Western Pacific Regional Office
Profile	<p>After graduating from Nishogakusha University in 1985, he joined the Japanese Red Cross Society, and after being seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then, transferred his status to the International Organization, Assistance Committee for the Former Soviet Union, where he was in charge of humanitarian assistance in the field of healthcare to the former Soviet Union in NIS assistance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In August 1994, he was moved to Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services which is semi-governmental organization of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. As the Director, he managed all ODA projects in health field commissioned by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, including Japan's first project to accept nurses and care workers (in the Philippines and Indonesia). In February 2009, he was appointed as Deputy Director and Professor at Centre for International Collaborative Research of Nagasaki University and supervised all international activities of Nagasaki University. He was subsequently seconded to WHO in July 2011 by order of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. After working at the Global Health Workforce Alliance as a liaison to the Chair (Deputy Director for International Health, MHLW) for 4 years, he has been working on the reform of the WHO Kobe Centre as a Senior Advisor since July 2015, and has been in his current position since May 2019. PhD candidate at Gunma University, School of Health Science.</p>
Lecture summary	<p>There cannot be a health system without health workers. The quality and availability of health workers in the right number and places determine a health system's overall effectiveness and strength. Health workers are the cornerstone of any health system and service delivery.</p> <p>Health workers are central to attaining, sustaining, and accelerating progress on universal health coverage (UHC) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in health systems and widespread and continued underinvestment in the health workforce. Investment in the health workforce can yield far-reaching health, social, economic and security benefits for the 37 countries and areas in the Western Pacific Region.</p> <p>In the Region, the need to plan and manage a competent health workforce to adequately respond to the changing population health needs is well recognized. To address the Region's challenges, the workforce envisioned for the future should be people-centred, culturally sensitive, adaptive, skilled in digital health, able to work and learn in teams, motivated and well-performing, and committed to professional development. The health workers also need to be protected, supported, and invested.</p>
Reading list	<p>Shaping a health workforce for the future <a href="https://www.who.int/westernpacific/publications/m/item/WPR-2023-RDO-002">https://www.who.int/westernpacific/publications/m/item/WPR-2023-RDO-002</a></p>



## Dr. Satoshi EZOE

Title	Director, Global Health Strategy Division
Affiliation	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan
Profile	<p>Dr. Satoshi Ezoë currently serves as Director, Global Health Strategy Division, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), since 2020, where he oversees and coordinates Japan's global health diplomacy and strategy, including COVID-19 response. He is also cross appointed as Director at Headquarters for Healthcare Policy, Cabinet Secretariat, since 2021. Prior to joining MOFA, he was engaged in health care and public health policy in the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, including in the areas of global health, universal health insurance system, non-communicable diseases including mental health and cancer control. He was seconded to UNAIDS Headquarters in Geneva (2009-2012). He was the first appointed Senior Coordinator for Global Health (2015- 2017), where he was involved in the WHO emergency reform, coordinating health agendas for the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in 2016. He was most recently Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations (2017-2020), where he was instrumental in facilitating UN General Assembly High-Level Meetings on tuberculosis (2018) and universal health coverage (2019). He is a Medical Doctor with PhD, and received Master of Public Health and Master in Public Administration from the Harvard University.</p>
Lecture summary	<p>This lecture intends to share examples of key and difficult negotiations on global health based on hand-on experience by the presenter. These cases would include but not limited to below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- G7 Hiroshima Summit/Nagasaki Health Minister's Meeting</li><li>- UNGA High-Level Meeting on UHC</li><li>- COVAX AMC Summit 2021</li></ul>
Reading list	<p>Suggested:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Satoshi Ezoë, et.al. (2021) "The Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage (2019): Negotiating the most comprehensive agreement ever reached on global health", A GUIDE TO GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. (PP. 235-252) <a href="https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/sites/internet/files/2021-02/GHC-Guide.pdf">https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/sites/internet/files/2021-02/GHC-Guide.pdf</a></li><li>2. Fumio Kishida. Human security and universal health coverage: Japan's vision for the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Lancet. 2023 Jan 28;401(10373):246-247.</li></ol>

## Reading list

3. Ezoe S, Hashimoto J, Nishida Y, Namikawa H, Yoneda M, et.al. Health outcomes of the G7 Hiroshima Summit: breaking the cycle of panic and neglect and achieving UHC. Lancet. 2023 Jun 24;401(10394):2091-2093
4. Dr. EZOE Satoshi. "Toward New Solidarity in Global Health: Universal Health Coverage and Reform at the WHO" No.67, Diplomacy Oct. 27, 2021  
[https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/pdf/2021/no67/DJweb\\_67\\_dip\\_02.pdf](https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/pdf/2021/no67/DJweb_67_dip_02.pdf)
5. Japanese: 江副聡 (2021) 「国際保健をめぐる新たな連帯へーユニバーサル・ヘルス・カバレッジとWHO改革」 『雑誌 外交』 Vol.65 Jan./Feb. 2021  
[http://www.gaiko-web.jp/test/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Vol65\\_p100-105\\_New\\_solidarity\\_over\\_international\\_health.pdf](http://www.gaiko-web.jp/test/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Vol65_p100-105_New_solidarity_over_international_health.pdf)
6. Japanese: 馬淵俊介、江副聡 (2021) 「「パニック&ネグレクト」を繰り返すなーワクチンへの公平なアクセスに向けた国際的展開」 『雑誌 外交』 Vol.69 Sep./Oct. 2021  
[http://www.gaiko-web.jp/test/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Vol69\\_p110-117\\_Do\\_not\\_repeat\\_Panic\\_and\\_neglect.pdf](http://www.gaiko-web.jp/test/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Vol69_p110-117_Do_not_repeat_Panic_and_neglect.pdf)

## Key Resources

Cabinet Secretariat. The Global Health Strategy. May 24, 2022

English: [https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kenkouiryou/en/pdf/final\\_GHS\\_outline.pdf](https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kenkouiryou/en/pdf/final_GHS_outline.pdf)

Japan: [https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kenkouiryou/senryaku/r040524global\\_health.pdf](https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kenkouiryou/senryaku/r040524global_health.pdf)

Health, MOFA

English: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/health\\_c/index.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/health_c/index.html)

Japanese: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/hoken.html>

Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio's participation in the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage (UHC)

[https://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ghs/page6e\\_000391.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ghs/page6e_000391.html)

Minister for Foreign Affairs KAMIKAWA Yoko's participation in the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting

on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (PPR)

[https://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ghs/page7e\\_000043.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ghs/page7e_000043.html)

As available (Japanese):



## Dr. Suwit WIBULPOLPRASERT

### Affiliation

International Health Policy Program, Bangkok

### Profile

Dr. Suwit Wibulpolprasert is a public health specialist, administrator and policy advocate at national and global level. He began his career as a Director and practitioner in rural areas and has various technical and administrative experience in Thai FDA, the Bureau of Health Policy and Plan, Deputy Permanent Secretary and the senior expert in Disease Control. He has been proactively working in public health area more than 3 decades from the grass root to the highest policy level. In parallel with working for the development of health in country, he is one of global health leader who is well-known in the public eye as the fore front fighter to protect the benefit of the poors. At present, he is the Board Member of the National Health Security Office, the National Electronics and Computer Technology Center, and the National Nanotechnology Centre, the member of the National Science and Technology development committee.

Dr. Suwit is also the Vice Chair of the International Health Policy Program Foundation (IHPF) and the Health Intervention and Technology Assessment Foundation (HITAF), the chair of the Yothi Medical Innovation District, the Chair of the Institute for the Development of Human Research Protections Foundation (IHRPF), and the Chair of the Health and Society Creation Foundation.

Dr. Suwit is one of the most experienced health system specialist and has involved and contributed in Thailand's health system development for decades. He always reiterates that health systems can become more equitable, inclusive and fair through primary health care strengthening. Clear evidences from many developed countries tell us that we are now in the right direction to focus on primary health care, not the institutional care. The success is not all about money but the most important is the heart and the spirit of the health personnel.

### Lecture summary

### Reading list





## Mr. Charlie GARNJANA-GOONCHORN

Title Mr.

Affiliation Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand

Profile Dr. Charlie Garnjana-Goonchorn joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007. He started his career working at the Treaty Division overseeing various aspects of Thailand's treaty making process. During his post at the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN in Geneva, he was in charge of extensive areas of work, including those within the purview of WHO and UNCTAD. After returning to Thailand in 2017, he has played a key role in several international disputes involving the Royal Thai Government, in addition to providing legal advice related to international trade, investment treaties, dispute settlement mechanisms and arbitration.

Lecture summary The lecture will run through the basic principles of negotiation, explore how to use negotiation skills in a multilateral context especially in Global Health Diplomacy. The lecture will also highlight what negotiators should be looking out for, what are the usual traps, and how to address them.

Reading list



## Ms. Tomoko ONODA

Title	Health systems coordinator
Affiliation	WHO Country Office in Cambodia
Profile	<p>Ms. Tomoko Onoda is currently working for WHO, providing technical advice on health systems to the Ministry of Health in Cambodia.</p> <p>Prior to take this position, Ms. Onoda worked for Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan for more than 20 years. In 2023, as director of G7 office of MHLW, she was in charge of Health Ministers' meeting in Nagasaki and also worked with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on health agendas of G7 Hiroshima Summit.</p> <p>In addition, in the Ministry she had working experience on various areas including ageing policy, health reform, global health, international negotiations on EPAs, policy on people with disabilities, labour laws, social security systems, COVID 19 response etc.</p> <p>Ms. Onoda worked abroad as well, served MoFA of Japan in Geneva for 3 years, and worked for OECD on pensions as economist for 3 years.</p>
Lecture summary	<p>Ms. Onoda received BA in economics from Tokyo University in Japan, and MSc from Harvard School of Public Health in the U.S.</p> <p>The COVID-19 pandemic had profound impacts on our society, economy, and security as well as our health and lives.</p> <p>In this context, G7 countries were engaged in discussions on the three pillars;</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Develop and strengthen global health architecture for public health emergencies</li><li>2) Contribute to achieving more resilient, equitable, and sustainable universal health coverage (UHC) through strengthening health systems, and</li><li>3) Promote health innovations to address various health challenges.</li></ol>
Reading list	<p>The session will introduce the outcome of "G7 Health Ministers' Meeting in Nagasaki" and health agendas of "G7 Hiroshima Summit", focusing on the process of the discussion to reach consensus under Japan's Presidency in 2023.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. "G7 Health Ministers' Meeting in Nagasaki" <a href="https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/hokabunya/kokusai/g8/g7health2023_en.html">https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/hokabunya/kokusai/g8/g7health2023_en.html</a></li><li>2. G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/100506875.pdf">100506875.pdf (mofa.go.jp)</a></li></ol>